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This Article integrates social science theory about immigrant
incorporation and administrative agencies with empirical data about
immigrant-serving federal workplace agencies to illuminate the role of
bureaucracies in the construction of rights. More specifically, it contends
that immigrants' rights can be protected when workplace agencies
incorporate immigrants into labor law enforcement in accordance with the
agencies' professional ethos and organizational mandates. Building on
Miles' Law that "where you stand depends on where you sit," this Article
argues that agencies exercise discretion in the face of contested law and in
contravention to a political climate hostile to undocumented immigrants for
the purpose of protecting workers. Consequently, strongly pro-immigrant
policies in the political branches are not necessary for the recovery of
immigrants' rights. Instead, entrenched institutional commitments to
professional ethics and recognition of organizational mandates constrain
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politics resulting in a hybrid form of bureaucratic politics. Empirical
evidence of regulatory responses to immigrant workers after Hoffman
Plastic v. NLRB in three federal agencies serve as comparative case
studies: the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board.
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INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding President Obama's re-election in 2012, immigration
scholars in the legal academy have been exceedingly pessimistic about the
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federal government's commitment to undocumented' workers' rights over
the last decade. A majority of the criticisms focus on the need for
comprehensive immigration reform in Congress.2 A considerable number
of these critiques focus on Hoffman as case law limiting the protective
remedies of undocumented workers against employers who exploit the most
vulnerable among their labor force." The minority of legal scholars who
seriously consider agency actions contend that such actions are insufficient
and inadequate, even if well-intended.4  Immigration scholars have
I. Throughout the article, I use "noncitizen" and "immigrant" interchangeably. I favor these
terms over "alien," which still appears in legal language and some legal scholarship. Where the text
refers expressly to undocumented workers as opposed to immigrants with work authorization, I specify
"undocumented."
2. A sample of articles calling for comprehensive immigration reform includes: Kevin Johnson,
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Symposium: Problems, Possibilities and Pragmatic Solutions: Ten
Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1599 (2009); Hiroshi Motomura, What is Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Taking the Long View,
63 ARK. L. REV. 225 (2010); Michael A. Olivas, Comprehensive Immigration Reform Symposium:
Problems, Possibilities and Pragmatic Solutions: The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and
Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1757
(2010).
3. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002); see, e.g., Elizabeth R.
Baldwin, Damage Control: Staking Claim to Employment Law Remedies for Undocumented Immigrant
Workers after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 233 (2003); Jennifer
Berman, The Needle and the Damage Done: How Hoffman Plastics Promotes Sweatshops and Illegal
Immigration and What to Do About It, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 585 (2004); Dennise A. Calderon-
Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor
Laws?, 6 HARV. LATING L. REV. 119 (2003); Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc v. NLRB: The Rules of the Workplace for Undocumented Immigrants, in IMMIGRATION
STORIES 311 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005); Shahid Haque, Beyond Hoffman Plastic:
Reforming National Labor Relations Policy to Conform to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 79
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357 (2004); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court's Role in Making Federal Labor
Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2003); Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:
How the Supreme Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21
LAW & INEQ. 313 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement
through Partnerships with Workers' Organizations, 38 POL. & Soc'Y 552, 553 (2010). Citing multiple
reports demonstrating high rates of industry noncompliance with wage and hour laws, Gordon and Fine
proclaim that "labor standards enforcement is not working." Id. at 553. They attribute noncompliance
not only to a lack of resources, but also to an inherent mismatch between modem workplaces and
agencies' logic of detecting violators. See also Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2011) (arguing that the Department of Labor has "struggled" to protect
unauthorized workers due to information asymmetries with ICE); Kati L. Griffith, ICE Was Not Meant
to Be Cold: The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the Workplace, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 1137 (2011) (characterizing worker protection as central to the federal regulation of
immigrant workers and calling on the EEOC and ICE to adhere to Congressional intent); Jayesh M.
Rathod, Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency Cooperation, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1157,
1158-62 (2011) (enumerating the complexity of the regulatory environment and the inevitable
politicization of regulatory bodies as obstacles to cooperation between the DOL and the ICE); Michael J.
Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 389, 390-91 (2003-2004) [hereinafter Wishnie, The Border] (presenting evidence of "deep
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especially expressed dismay about the deleterious effects of White House
policies relying on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) worksite
enforcement actions as a strategy for immigration control and the inability
of workplace agencies to counter these actions.' The criticisms extend
across Republican and Democratic administrations.6 While based on
understandable disappointment with President Obama's first term policies
on immigration, immigration scholars' dismissals of agencies clash with the
growing interest of social scientists in bureaucracies as vital sites for
immigrant incorporation. These social scientists contend that immigrants
can be well served by agencies in the face of restrictive legal precedent on
the rights of immigrant workers.' Indeed, bureaucracies can even
accomplish more for immigrants than the political branches as a byproduct
of their commitment to the rule of law and professional ethics.'
This Article integrates legal scholarship on immigrant workers with
social science theory about bureaucratic discretion and the role of
bureaucracies in the construction of rights. More specifically, it integrates
two competing theories of agency behavior to propose a theory of
bureaucratic incorporation largely consistent with Miles' law that "where
you stand" on a policy matter often depends on "where you sit" within an
organization.' The article uncovers empirical evidence of regulatory
responses to Hoffman Plastic v. NLRB," which limited the remedies
available to undocumented workers facing workplace abuses, to illustrate
this theory. A comparison of three case studies-the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)-uncovers a pattern
of regulatory resistance to hostile immigrants' rights laws. Characterizing
these agency responses as reconfiguring, buffering, and mitigating
respectively, the Article contends that federal workplace agencies use
discretion to issue guidance that counters the contraction of immigrants'
rights in courts. Counterintuitively for immigration scholars, the Article
entanglement" of worksite and immigration enforcement activities in 102 of 184 INS raids in New York
City from 1997-1999).
5. See Wishnie, The Border, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., N.C. Aizenman, Latinos Increasingly Critical of Obama's Record on Immigration,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/19/AR2010031904676.htm; Jonathan Xavier Inda, Borderzones of
Enforcement: Criminalization, Workplace Raids, and Migrant Counterconducts, in THE CONTESTED
POLITICS OF MOBILITY: BORDERZONES AND IRREGULARITY 74-75 (Vicki Squire ed., 2011); Jennifer
Ludden, Immigration Experts Predict Fewer Workplace Raids, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Dec. 2, 2008,
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=97700373 (last visited 10/1/2012).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
8. For an elaboration of these concepts, see the social science literature on bureaucratic
incorporation in Part II.
9. See infra note 65 for the origins of Miles' law.
10. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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attributes these acts of regulatory resistance to a professional ethos of
protecting workers and to a commitment to enforcing labor laws
independent of the policy preferences of the civil servants and political
leadership. While this finding may not surprise bureaucracy scholars-
some of whom have studied regulatory guidance other settings- it
contributes a more nuanced portrayal of institutional dynamics in a novel
setting: the regulation of undocumented workers where law and politics
collide."
Other explanations can also be offered for the acts of regulatory
resistance described herein. The goal of this Article is not to canvass every
possible factor, nor to argue in favor of a single causal explanation. The
phenomenon is, assuredly, multi-causal. The Article's case studies show
that the political leadership within an agency does make a difference to the
robustness of regulatory resistance in terms of allocating resources and
prioritizing certain areas of enforcement over others. But they also show
that exercise of discretion within agencies is constrained by considerations
such as professional ethos, agency culture, and the perceived mandate of the
agency to enforce labor and employment laws.' 2 Moreover, the Article
does not claim that regulatory resistance is superior to other forms of
immigrant worker advocacy or legislative and litigation intervention, which
can also curtail rights retractions; nor does it challenge legal scholars'
perceptions that the agencies could do more. The Article's chief
contribution is to empirically illustrate institutional dynamics that reinforce
bureaucratic protections for immigrant workers when the agencies are
confronted by a countervailing legal and political environment, and to probe
the motivations of agency officials for intervening of behalf of those
immigrant workers.
Part I introduces the legal and political environment of regulating
immigrant workers and documents instances of regulatory resistance to
Hoffman. Part II reviews emerging social science literature on bureaucratic
incorporation and assesses its relevance to the regulation of immigrant
workers. Part III applies the concept of bureaucratic politics to case studies
of labor and employment law enforcement 3 in the NLRB, the DOL, and the
it. With the exception of Jill Family, few scholars have placed criticism of immigration agencies
in the context of classic debates in administrative law. Family presupposes that although immigration
law is idiosyncratic in many ways, "on the subject of administrative guidance, immigration law is in the
mainstream," particularly when it comes to troubles with guidance documents. Jill E. Family,
Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64. ADMIN. L. REv. 565, 616 (2012). She
concludes that the proper use of guidance in immigration agencies entails trade-offs: they provide
"flexible tools" and "a window into the agency's outlook and attitude" in a complex and rapidly-
changing area of law administered by a diffuse group, even if they curtail the certainty of notice and
comment rulemaking. Id. at 589.
12. These terms are defined more fully in the literature review within Part II.
13. Throughout this article, I refer to the EEOC, NLRB, and DOL interchangeably as law
enforcement agencies and federal regulatory agencies. While "regulatory agency" may be more
2012 231
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EEOC. Part IV extends the findings by explicating similarities and
differences in the federal workplace agencies' responses to Hoffman and
theorizing application to other studies. The Conclusion explores the
implications of bureaucratic incorporation theory and the empirical
evidence for legal scholarship on undocumented immigrant workers' rights.
I.
REGULATION OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT WORKERS' RIGHTS
Few would dispute that the legal and political climate for immigrant
workers, especially undocumented workers, has been forbidding over the
last decade. Immigrant workers have always been vulnerable to workplace
abuse, but ever since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) the workplace has become a site of contention and fear.
The Supreme Court's landmark Hoffman Plastic v. NLRB decision in 2002
interpreted the employer sanctions provision of IRCA to limit remedies for
undocumented workers subjected to unlawful discharge for reporting
workplace abuses. The combined effect of Hoffman and IRCA was to
create perverse economic incentives for employers to exploit immigrant
workers suspected of lacking status and to dim the prospects for immigrant
workers to challenge those abuses. The Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) aggressive use of workplace raids as a strategy for
immigration control-first under President Bush and continuing under
President Obama, albeit to a lesser extent-has exacerbated the situation,
making credible employer threats to expose the status of their immigrant
workers lacking documentation in retaliation for those workers'
complaints.14  Tasked with enforcing employment laws in a climate
commonly used in the bureaucratic incorporation literature, the agencies refer to themselves as "law
enforcement" to underscore their function of eliciting legal compliance from regulated entities.
Nevertheless, the three workplace agencies under study should be not be confused with local law
enforcement (police) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-agencies that may also come to
mind.
14. See Julia Preston, A Crackdown on Employing Illegal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2011, at
Al (noting that "Under President George W. Bush, immigration agents frequently conducted high-
profile factory raids, leading away scores of unauthorized workers in handcuffs, often to face jail time
for document fraud or identity theft before being deported," while "Obama administration officials are
sharpening their crackdown on the hiring of illegal immigrants by focusing increasingly tough criminal
charges on employers while moving away from criminal arrests of the workers themselves. . . While
conducting fewer headline-making factory raids, the immigration authorities [under Obama] have
greatly expanded the number of businesses facing scrutiny and the cases where employers face severe
sanctions."); Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept From Jobs in "Silent Raids," N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2010, at Al ("Over the past year, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has conducted audits of
employee files at more than 2,900 companies. The agency has levied a record $3 million in civil fines so
far this year on businesses that hired unauthorized immigrants, according to official figures. Thousands
of those workers have been fired, immigrant groups estimate. Employers say the audits reach more
companies than the work-site roundups of the administration of President George W. Bush."); Peter
Slevin, Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases Under Obama Administration, THE WASHINGTON
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entangling immigration control with employment, workplace agencies have
been caught in the crossfire: their statutory mandate to protect workers
remains intact, while the political and legal context blunts their tools to
implement that mandate. Each of the federal agencies discussed in this
Article has struggled to reconcile the competing demands of their
professional ethos with aggressive immigration enforcement and with
contracting immigrants' rights.
This Part provides an overview of the political and legal context of
federal workplace agencies. It focuses on the federal agencies that
comprise the regulatory environment of immigrant workers and on legal
developments limiting the rights of undocumented workers. It begins by
briefly describing the institutional architecture of regulating immigrant
workers. It then describes the Hoffman decision and the framework of laws
and policies limiting the rights of undocumented workers. Finally, it details
three case studies in which those agencies have used memoranda, policy
statements, and other forms of guidance that fall short of regulations to
resist legal developments elsewhere in the federal government."
A. Institutional Architecture ofRegulating Immigrant Workers
Three important federal agencies engaged in the regulation of
immigrant worker rights are the National Labor Relations Board, the U.S.
Department of Labor, and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Each agency regulates a different federal statute, each of
which is focused on workers in general and only secondarily on immigrant
workers. With the exception of the DOL's enforcement of the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act and select provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act pertaining to work-related visa
POST, July 26, 2010 ("The Obama administration has been moving away from using work-site raids to
target employers. Just 765 undocumented workers have been arrested at their jobs this fiscal year,
compared with 5,100 in 2008, according to Department of Homeland Security figures. Instead, officers
have increased employer audits, studying the employee documentation of 2,875 companies suspected of
hiring illegal workers and assessing $6.4 million in fines.")
15. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) makes a distinction between formal rulemaking and
informal rulemaking that turns to a large extent on the process by which the regulatory outputs are
derived. In formal rulemaking, such as decision-making in Immigration Courts, the agency holds an
actual hearing and produces a record based on evidence presented. Informal rulemaking requires no
actual hearing, in contrast, but usually the agency must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking and
final rule prior to the rule becoming effective if it wants the rule to carry the force of law. Exceptions
are made for policy statements, which sometimes but do not always carry the force of law. Guidance can
take many forms including internal memoranda, inter-agency Memoranda of Understanding, Dear
Colleague or advisory letters, operating instructions, and compliance manuals; while influential, these
guidance documents are not legally binding. Most of the issuances in this Article refer to policy
statements and guidance. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L. J. 1311,
1319-27 (1992) (offering a taxonomical guide to the various forms of sub-regulatory guidance and their
legal effect).
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programs,16 the National Labor Relations Act," the Fair Labor Standards
Act,'" and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" - guiding statutes for
the NLRB, DOL, and EEOC respectively-do not explicitly mention
immigrants. The agencies rely almost entirely on informal policies or
practices to discern their responsibilities to immigrant workers. In most
cases, the agencies adopt a status-blind approach to law enforcement,
making no distinctions between the formal legal status of documented and
undocumented workers in protecting workers' statutory rights. These
stances are elaborated below.
The NLRB is an independent agency charged with investigating and
remedying unfair labor practices. It administers the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). 20  Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 to protect
the rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining,
and to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices which
harm the general welfare of workers, businesses, and the U.S. economy.2'
The statute itself includes no express provisions for immigrants. Case law
reveals that immigrants are within its statutory purview and have long been
recognized as subjects of regulation.22 Hoffman, which will be discussed in
Part I.B, grew out of this line of decisions about the scope of rights and
remedies available to undocumented workers under the NLRA. Some of
the offices most attentive to immigrants' rights are situated within the
NLRB's Office of General Counsel. The General Counsel's office is
comprised of three units: Advice, Operations-Management, and
Enforcement Litigation. All three encounter undocumented immigrants in
the course of enforcing labor laws.
16. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1811-1816 (2012);
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2012).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
20. Id.
21. James Gross authored a series of books and articles detailing the history of the NLRB. See
JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947-1994
(2003); James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years ofNLRB Law
Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7 (1985); JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NLRB: A STUDY
IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1974). Beginning in 2008, the Board sunk into a state of near-
paralysis when three of its five seats became vacant. In March 2010, President Obama appointed two
union lawyers to the board using recess appointments. Labor unions argued that the appointments
restored some balance after the board favored business under President George W. Bush. After Chair
Liebman resigned in summer 2011 (bringing the Board back to two members), President Obama once
again used recess appointments to install replacements. Those appointments are the subject of
controversy given that the Senate claims that it had a constitutional duty to confirm the appointments.
See Charlie Savage, Justice Department Defends Obama's Recess Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2012, at A12.
22. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (1 Ith Cir. 1988), and earlier FLSA cases
involving undocumented immigrants extending the "covered employee" logic of landmark decisions
such as Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
234
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The DOL complements the NLRB's work by administering laws
concerning workplace conditions, wages, and other employment standards.
Amid the patchwork of laws the DOL administers, the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) 23 of 1938 prescribes standards for wages and overtime pay,
which affect most private and public employment. The DOL Wage and
Hour Division administers the FLSA. The Wage and Hour Division
requires employers to pay covered employees who are not otherwise
exempt at least the federal minimum wage and overtime pay of one-and-
one-half-times the regular rate of pay. It also enforces the labor standards
provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act that apply to aliens
authorized to work in the United States under certain nonimmigrant visa
programs (H-lB, H-1Bl, H-IC, H2A, H2B). The Wage and Hour Division
also administers the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act (MPSA), which regulates the hiring and employment activities of
agricultural employers, farm labor contractors, and associations using
migrant and seasonal agricultural workers. The MPSA prescribes wage
protections, housing and transportation safety standards, farm labor
contractor registration requirements, and disclosure requirements. Other
branches of the DOL administer the Occupational Safety and Health Act
and a panoply of laws that indirectly impact immigrant workers. The
Office of the Solicitor provides legal advice on interpretations of
immigrants' rights under the statutes the Department enforces since they
frequently present issues of first impression.
The EEOC was established for a different purpose than the NLRB and
the DOL: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created it and charged it
with eradicating employment discrimination.24 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.25 Title VII also prohibits employer retaliation against a
worker for the reason that the worker complained about discrimination,
filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an employment
discrimination investigation or lawsuit.26 While citizenship status is not
coterminous with national origin discrimination, the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of national origin sometimes provides a
statutory basis for interventions on behalf of immigrants.27 National origin
23. 29 U.S.C. § 201.
24. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4.
25. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2.
26. Id.
27. See Enforcement Guidance: National Origin Discrimination, 13 EEOC Compl. Man 13-1l
(Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidance], available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html#ll. See generally Ming H. Chen, Regulatory
Rights: Civil Rights Agencies Translating "National Origin Discrimination" into Language Rights,
1965-1979 (Spring 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U.C. Berkeley examining the application of
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discrimination involves treating people unfavorably because they are from a
particular country or part of the world, because of ethnicity or accent, or
because they appear to be of a certain ethnic background. 28 Although the
EEOC does not directly enforce the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA),29 the EEOC works closely with the U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Labor Practices
to ensure fair implementation of its provisions forbidding discrimination
against lawful immigrants.30 These special provisions were enacted to
ensure that sanctions placed on employers for hiring undocumented workers
would not lead to racial profiling or otherwise discourage the hiring of
workers perceived to be immigrants for jobs that need not require U.S.
citizenship. IRCA further specifies that employers may not refuse to accept
lawful documentation that establishes an employee's employment
eligibility, or demand additional documentation beyond the 1-9 form legally
required when verifying employment eligibility, based on the employee's
national origin or citizenship status. The EEOC's work is largely
complaint-driven, with staff handling routine enforcement matters and
litigation in field offices. A headquarters staff in its Office of General
Counsel handles litigation and other regional casework requiring
coordination, and the Office of Legal Counsel consults with the bipartisan,
politically appointed Commissioners on developing unified policy.
Although the Department of Homeland Security does not fall within
this Article's express focus, its actions constitute an important part of the
regulatory environment in which the focal agencies act. The DHS
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) regulates immigrant workers
through interior enforcement strategies targeting workplaces to uncover
unlawful hiring of noncitizen workers in violation of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act and the Immigration Reform and Control Act.' Acting
on Congress' belief that prospects for economic gain motivate migration,
the DHS executes laws prohibiting employers from hiring of workers
without first verifying their immigration status, in an effort to "disable the
magnet" that attracts migrant workers.32 These laws have teeth: IRCA's
national origin protections to immigrants under Title Vii and other civil rights statutes), available at
http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.eduletd/ucb/text/Chen berkeley_0028E11 462.pdf.
28. EEOC National Origin Discrimination Guidance, supra note 27.
29. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
30. The DOJ Office of Special Counsel was created by IRCA to ensure that the imposition of
employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers would not result in national origin discrimination,
harassment, or other unfair practices against those perceived to be immigrants. The jurisdiction of OSC
and EEOC largely turns on the size of the employer, coverage of undocumented immigrants, and
available remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.
31. Other branches of the Department of Homeland Security include U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services and Customs and Border Patrol.
32. Through IRCA, Congress endeavored to simultaneously deter unlawful migration and to
protect U.S. workers from depressed wages and conditions generated by the fulfillment of jobs by
236
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employer sanctions state that neglecting to verify status leads to civil
penalties and that knowingly hiring undocumented workers can trigger
criminal penalties.3 3  IRCA also have serious consequences for
undocumented workers who can be deported if their lack of status is
discovered. The tactic of worksite "raids" for immigration control led to a
deportation boom during the Bush Administration, but receives decreasing
emphasis in the Obama Administration's immigration enforcement
strategy.34
B. Hoffman Plastic and Regulatory Resistance in Workplace Agencies
While all three workplace agencies administer distinct federal statutes,
they have all been either directly or indirectly impacted by IRCA and
related case law limiting undocumented workers' rights. Key among these
decisions is Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.15 In Hoffman, the
Supreme Court ruled that undocumented workers are not eligible for
backpay under the NLRA because granting backpay would conflict with
IRCA's mandate to prevent the hiring of undocumented workers." The
case arose from charges that Hoffman Plastic Compounds, a California firm
that produces plastic materials used to make pharmaceutical, construction,
and household products, unlawfully fired nine workers after learning of
their organizing activities in 1989." In response to an AFL-CIO sponsored
immigrant workers willing to work for less. Preventing employers from hiring those workers would
diminish job opportunities, which in turn would eliminate incentives for economically-motivated
migration from places with even more depressed wages and work conditions.
33. IRCA makes it illegal for employers to "hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment
in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien" and to continue "to employ the
alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to
such employment." Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified at § 1324a(l)). If an employer violates IRCA, he will be "fined not more than $3,000 for each
unauthorized alien" or be imprisoned for up to six months. Id. at (f)(l). An employer is allowed a
"good faith" defense if it "establishes that it has complied in good faith with the requirements. . with
respect to the hiring, recruiting, or referral for employment of an alien in the United States has
established an affirmative defense that the person or entity has not violated paragraph [(a)](1)(A) with
respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral." Id. at (a)(3).
34. The Obama administration has shifted away from worksites as interior enforcement strategies
and toward criminal and security-related enforcement strategies. Department of Homeland Security,
Frequently Asked Questions on the Administration's Announcement Regarding a New Process to
Further Focus Immigration Enforcement Resources on High Priority Cases,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/aboutloffices/ero/pdflimmigration-enforcement-facts.pdf (last visited Nov.
14, 2012). These shifted priorities are bome out by data on enforcement outcomes. For example, since
President Obama took office, the overall number of worksite raids has diminished, and in fiscal year
2009 alone they dropped by 70%. Crackdowns on employers have doubled in the same period. See
Aizenman, supra note 6.
35. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). Much of the background
information concerning the Hoffman proceedings can be found in Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 3.
36. 535 U.S. at l51.
37. Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 3, at 317.
2012 237
BERKELEYJOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 33:2
organizing drive, the supervisors interrogated the employees about their
union activity and dismissed all involved with the union, including Jose
Castro and Casimiro Arauz." Mr. Arauz filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB.39 In 1990, the administrative law judge for the
NLRB held a hearing on the charge and found, inter alia, that Hoffman had
violated the NLRA by basing its layoff decisions on its workers' union
activity.4 0 "Both the General Counsel and [Hoffman] appealed to the full
NLRB, which... largely upheld the" administrative law judge's "findings
and conclusions."4 ' Most of the workers settled their claims with
Hoffman.42 The sole exception was Mr. Castro, whose immigration status
became an issue during a subsequent hearing on the remedies owed to him;
the Board typically orders reinstatement and backpay from the date of
discharge to the date of reinstatement (minus mitigating income obtained
through interim employment, as required by the NLRA), but the legal
question was how to account for an undocumented immigrant's ineligibility
to work.43
The law governing Mr. Castro's eligibility for remedies was complex,
inviting contest at each stage of litigation and potentially placing
immigration and labor laws governing immigrant workers in conflict. Over
a decade prior, the Court had announced that the NLRA statutorily
protected undocumented workers, but it left unclear whether backpay
remedies were available to those workers." The case law of the NLRB and
the Ninth Circuit at the time that charges were filed against Hoffman held
undocumented workers eligible for backpay if they were physically present
in the United States (as opposed to deported).45 Contrasting Seventh Circuit
precedent would have held Castro ineligible for backpay under those same
38. Id.




43. Id. at 318-20.
44. In Sure Tan, Inc. v NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), an employer whose employees voted for a
union contacted the INS. The INS questioned all Spanish-speaking employees, then arrested and
deported five of them. The Board found that the employer's actions prompting an INS raid amounted to
unlawful constructive discharge and ordered reinstatement with backpay. They left for the compliance
hearing the question of whether the deported workers were "available for work" as required to be
eligible for backpay. The reviewing circuit court of appeals calculated six month's backpay, based on
the assumption that the workers would likely have been employed for that length of time absent the
employer's unlawful labor practices. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling that the workers were
covered, but it struck the mandatory minimum backpay award as too speculative (IRCA had not yet
been enacted and it was not unlawful for an undocumented immigrant to be hired or to work in the
United States).
45. Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB (Felbro), 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that a wrongfully discharged undocumented worker who remains in country is eligible
for backpay), abrogated by Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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circumstances.46 The administrative law judge followed Seventh Circuit
precedent, even though Hoffman was located in California.47 During a five-
year lag while awaiting review from the full NLRB (which changed in
composition and issued new Board precedent in the intervening time48), the
Board awarded partial backpay; Hoffman persisted with an appeal to the
D.C. Circuit, which it eventually lost.49 On review, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Board lacked the discretion to award undocumented
workers backpay for wages they were ineligible to earn for work not yet
performed in 2002.0 In a controversial 5-4 decision, the majority reasoned
that providing backpay would conflict with U.S. immigration policies
requiring: (1) employees to present documents establishing their identity
and authorization to work when hired, and (2) employers to check those
documents and to refrain from knowingly hiring someone not authorized to
work."' The dissenting justices expressed concern over the soundness of
the legal reasoning, especially the undesirable policy implication that
employers could avoid liability for labor violations if the charges were
brought by undocumented immigrant workers.52
Given the decision's importance for immigrant workers and
inescapable questions about regulatory interpretation and implementation,
Hoffman triggered a rapid response from all three federal workplace
agencies.53 Within months of Hoffman, the NLRB, the DOL, and the
EEOC promulgated policy statements, internal memoranda, and a variety of
regulatory guidance on the interpretation and implementation of case law."
46. Del Ray Tortilleria Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that undocumented
workers who remain in the country ineligible for backpay).
47. Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 3, at 320.
48. During this time lag, the Board issued a decision A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320
N.L.R.B. 408 (1995), which attempted to harmonize NLRA remedial authority with IRCA's prohibition
on employing unauthorized immigrants. The decision favored awarding NLRA remedies to reinforce
the major purpose of IRCA: deterring the employment of undocumented workers.
49. Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Tatel repeated the NLRB's conclusion that Congress'
intent was best served with expanded enforcement of labor standards. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2000). He distinguished as non-binding dicta a sentence in Sure
Tan that might have deemed employees unavailable for work during any period when they were not
lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States. See id. at 254, enforcement granted
by Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 639, 642 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
50. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 137.
51. Id. at 147-51.
52. Id. at 153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) ("[Backpay] discourag[es]
employers from violating the Nation's labor laws. Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay
provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers-for it
has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in the absence of the backpay weapon, employers
could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity.").
53. Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 3, at 332-33 (listing cases that followed in the aftermath of
Hoffman and describing policy-level attempts to limit the reach of the holding).
54. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, both formal and informal rulemaking carry the force
of law. Formal rulemaking requires agency adjudication with an actual hearing emulating a judicial
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While none of these promulgations took the form of notice and comment
rules and not all carried the independent force of law," these documents
memorialized the agencies' interpretation of existing law and indicated how
they planned to exercise their discretion. The defining characteristic of
each guidance document was an agency interpretation that blunted the
Supreme Court's opinion. While the specific exercise of discretion varied
across agencies, each agency read Hoffman narrowly, reaffirmed that
immigration status is not relevant to the labor and employment rights they
protect, and emphasized that the agency practice is not to inquire into
immigration status in the course of investigations.56 If the agencies find a
workplace violation and simultaneously reveal a lack of status by an
employee, they award monetary damages to the extent permitted by law.
Over time, they have also expanded mechanisms for redressing workplace
abuse, such as seeking protective orders regarding discovery of immigration
status, deferred action on deportation orders, and certifying U-visas for
DHS consideration. These mechanisms facilitate workers' vital
participation in labor enforcement actions and, in the case of the U-visa,
provide work authorization that restores the workers' ability to collect the
wages to which they are entitled once granted by the DHS. " For example,
an individual who qualifies for a U-visa can remain in the United States for
up to four years, will receive authorization to work, and may be eligible to
trial; informal rulemaking requires publication of a proposed rule in the Federal Register and the
solicitation of public opinion through a notice and comment period sometimes called a paper hearing
before finalizing the rule. Statements of policy and sub-regulatory guidance do not require these
procedures; they are meant to be advisory, but they do not carry the force of law in the sense of settling
future legal challenges. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006); William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322-23 (2001).
55. Distinguishing between binding rules and these forms of guidance is notoriously difficult and
sometimes tautological. The D.C. Circuit laid out two criteria that provide an operational definition for
this article: (1) the policy statement operates prospectively; and (2) the policy statement "genuinely
leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion." Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Am. Bus. Ass'n v. U.S., 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
56. See e.g. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL No.
915.002, RESCISSION OF ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (2002) [hereinafter EEOC
Rescission], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html (June 27, 2002); U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Fact Sheet No. 48: Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of
Hoffman Plastic decision on laws enforced by the Wage and Hour Division (2002) [hereinafter DOL
Fact Sheet], available at www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.htm (last updated July 2008).
57. New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant
Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014 (Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a, 299)
("[Created] to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate, and prosecute
cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, trafficking of aliens and other crimes described in section
101(a)(15)(U)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [(INA)] committed against aliens, while
offering protection to victims of such offenses in keeping with the humanitarian interests of the United
States"); Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §
1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. 1464, 1533.
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subsequently adjust her status.58  For an immigrant to qualify for U-visa
classification, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security must
determine the eligibility of immigrants for U-visa protection on the basis of
a statutorily provided showing.59 In addition to information provided by the
victim to address the factors listed above, the victim must include with his
petition a certification form from the law enforcement agency he is
assisting.60
While it is difficult to generalize from an array of uncoordinated
agency actions, their respective responses counter the judicial harms visited
upon immigrant workers in a challenging legal environment. As many of
the workplace agencies argued during the litigation and maintained during
statutory implementation, 6 ' avoiding backpay harms immigrant and
nonimmigrant workers alike by insulating employers from the
consequences of workplace abuses waged against undocumented workers.
This creates perverse incentives for employers and a double harm for the
immigrant and nonimmigrant workers who become more burdensome to
hire by comparison.62 In addition, limitations on worker remedies
undermine workplace agencies' enforcement efforts because they
discourage immigrant workers from coming forward to report labor
violations and they send a signal that the agencies devalue immigrant
workers' rights.
58. For more background on U-visas, see Leticia M. Saucedo, A New "U": Organizing Victims
and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891 (2008); Kathleen Kim, The Trajficked
Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers,
1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 284-87 (2009); Leslye E. Orloff, Kathryn C. Isom & Edmundo Saballos,
Mandatory U-Visa Certification Unnecessarily Undermines the Purpose ofthe Violence Against Women
Act's Immigration Protections and its "Any Credible Evidence" Rules - A Call for Consistency, 11
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619 (2010); Nat'l Emp. Law Project, The U Visa: A Potential Remedy for
Immigrant Workers Facing Labor Abuse (November 2011). As of November 2011, all three agencies
had released certification protocols for U visas. Copies of the agency protocols are available at
www just-pay.org.
59. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §
1513(a)(15)(U)(i), 114 Stat. 1464, 1534; 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(15)(U)(i) (2011) (being reviewed under the
2012 VAWA Reauthorization as of Aug. 1, 2012).
60. While the statute does not specify the certification agencies, subsequent DHS regulations
include the EEOC, DOL, and the NLRB. See New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity;
Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014 (Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
103, 212, 214, 248, 274a, 299); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2) (2012).
61. See Brief for Respondent, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)
(No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1597748; Brief for Respondent in Opposition, Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 34090274 (arguing that the NLRB's
limited backpay award is a proper exercise of its discretion, that Sure-Tan does not preclude limited
backpay under the circumstances, and that limited backpay accommodates the goals of the NLRA and
IRCA).
62. See, e.g., DONALD M. KERWIN & KRISTEN MCCABE, Labor Standards Enforcement and Low-
Wage Immigrants, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE LABOR MARKETS INITIATIVE (2011).
63. The sentiment resonates with longstanding case law in the NLRB. See, e.g., S. S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46-47 (1942) ("Section 10(c) of the [NLRA] permits the Board to require an
2012 241
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 33:2
Beyond the practical results, Hoffman indicates a broader phenomenon:
agencies exercising discretion for the purpose of protecting workers in the
face of contested law and in contravention to a political climate hostile to
undocumented immigrants.' It is in this sense that this Article
characterizes the collective agency responses as forms of regulatory
resistance. The question is why and under what circumstances do agencies
take these pro-immigrant stances? Part II describes the social science
theory of bureaucratic incorporation and political control as competing
explanations for agency actions. While not mutually exclusive, the Article
argues that bureaucratic incorporation constrains political influence on
policies towards undocumented workers. To again paraphrase Miles' Law,
the argument is that "where you stand" on policies toward undocumented
workers depends on "where you sit" in the government bureaucracy." This
theory is then applied to multiple case studies of post-Hoffman regulatory
intervention in Part III and IV.
II.
THEORIES OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
This Part integrates social science research on immigrant incorporation
with theory on political control and bureaucratic discretion as a foundation
for understanding the regulation of immigrant workers' rights. It starts with
the premise that bureaucratic protection of undocumented workers flows
from inherent ambiguities in law, particularly when agencies contemplate
policy implementation in complex regulatory arenas consisting of "shared
employer who has committed an unfair labor practice to take 'such affirmative action, including
reinstatement of employees, as will effectuate the policies of the Act[.J' This authorization is of
considerable breadth, and the courts may not lightly disturb the Board's choice of remedies. But it is
also true that this discretion has its limits . .. [T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally
important Congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for
careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of an
administrative body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its
immediate task.").
64. Scholars disagree about the harmfulness of Hoffman. For articles decrying the decision, see,
e.g., RUBEN GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: How LEGAL FAULT LINES DIVIDE WORKERS AND LEAVE
THEM WITHOUT PROTECTION (2012); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient
Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006). But cf the
perspective of labor law scholar Ellen Dannin, Symposium: The Evolving Definition of The Immigrant
Worker: The Intersection Between Employment, Labor, and Human Rights Law: Hoffman Plastics As
Labor Law - Equality At Last for Immigrant Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393 (2009) (arguing that
understanding whether Hoffman is good or bad is less important than is understanding bureaucratic
perceptions of the decision; guidance documents and first-person interviews provide insight into these
perceptions and illustrate the values that guide discretion when the law is unstable).
65. Rufus E. Miles, Jr., Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 399 (1978).
This phrase is commonly attributed to an article by Graham Alison. See Graham T. Alison, Conceptual
Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 689 (1969) (Alison credits Paul
Hammond, but Miles claims original authorship).
242
WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT
regulatory space" across agencies or contemplate multiple goals set by
Congress and the President for a single agency. Two competing
explanations for workplace agencies' favorable exercise of discretion are
critically examined: the political control and the professional ethos theses
emphasized by bureaucratic incorporation theorists. An integrated model of
agency behavior akin to Graham Alison's "bureaucratic politics" and
encapsulated by the Miles' Law cited in the title of this Article is favored."
This model of agency behavior acknowledges that political leadership
creates openings for change, but that the professional ethos of civil servants
constrains partisan preferences. This Part generates hypotheses that set
forth the unifying themes that Part III applies in three case studies.
A. Incorporation ofImmigrants and Bureaucratic Discretion
"Immigrant incorporation" refers to the inclusion of noncitizens into
society and can occur along economic, social, political, and cultural
dimensions.67 It speaks to the mechanisms that bring someone into full
membership in a community, a topic of growing interest among
immigration scholars across academic disciplines." The social science
literature on immigrant incorporation focuses on institutions as a key
component of the immigrant-receiving society, namely the United States,
and attempts to unpack the processes by which immigrants are absorbed
into that society.69 While scholars studying immigrant incorporation
traditionally focused on non-state institutions such as civic organizations,"
66. See Miles, supra note 65; Alison, supra note 65.
67. The terms inclusion and incorporation used in this paper are drawn from the social science
literature and meant to be descriptive. They are to be distinguished from the term "assimilation" used in
literature assessing the normative implications of cultural absorption. For more examples of the social
science research employing the terminology of incorporation, see Alejandro Portes & J6zsef Borocz,
Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation,
23 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 606 (1989); Mary C. Waters & Tomlis R. Jimenez, Assessing Immigrant
Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges, 31 ANNUAL REV. SOC. 105 (2005).
68. Rogers Brubaker, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 21, 23 (1992)
(defining the modem state as a "not simply a territorial organization but a membership organization, as
association of citizens;" "[c]itizenship is thus both an instrument and an object of closure"). Linda
Bosniak draws on membership theory in Citizenship Denationalized, an influential essay disaggregating
the notion of citizenship into legal status, rights, political activity, and identity or solidarity. Linda
Bosniak, Symposium: The State of Citizenship, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 447 (2000); see also D. Carolina Ntfiez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to
Secure Rights and Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIs. L. REV. 817 (2010) (applying
membership theory to workers).
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. See JANELLE S. WONG, DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE: IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN CIVIC
INSTITUTIONS (2006); Els de Graauw, Nonprofit Organizations: Agents of Immigrant Political
Incorporation in Urban America, in CIVIC HOPES AND POLITICAL REALITIES: IMMIGRANTS,
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 323 (S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Irene
Bloemraad eds., 2008).
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unions and worker groups," interest groups,72 and social movement
organizations," increasing interdisciplinary attention is being paid to
government institutions as sites of immigrant incorporation.7 4 An emerging
body of scholarship turns to bureaucracies as sites of immigrant
incorporation and to the important role that they play in policy
implementation." The attention to bureaucracies partly reflects scholarly
recognition that formal legal status is disaggregated into a bundle of
rights.76 The rights within that bundle can also be reordered; that is, the
grant of formal legal status that accompanies political incorporation of
immigrants need not precede social or economic rights for immigrants. In
some circumstances, economic rights or social rights provide the foundation
for subsequent belonging, and so the rights of membership for noncitizens
can follow the extension of social and economic rights. For example, rights
in the workplace have proved to be an important precursor for immigrants'
full membership in the broader community.77 At least on the books,
71. Shannon Gleeson, From Rights to Claims: The Role of Civil Society in Making Rights Real
for Vulnerable Workers, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 669 (2009); Gordon & Fine, supra note 4; Jennifer
Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers' Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s
and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMP'T L. 1 (2005).
72. DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS (2007); Dara Z. Strolovitch, Do Interest Groups Represent the Disadvantaged?
Advocacy at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender, 68 J. POL. 894 (2006).
73. RALLYING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: THE FIGHT FOR INCLUSION IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA
(Kim Voss & Irene Bloemraad eds., 2011).
74. In the scholarship on government interventions, emphasis is traditionally placed on political
institutions such as Congress. This is because political scientists traditionally presume that political
incorporation necessarily precedes social and economic incorporation-that is, citizenship in the sense
of acquiring formal legal status serves as a threshold for immigrants participating in other spheres of
life-and because they presume that political considerations motivate bureaucratic behaviors. Civil
servants within agencies strive to satisfy the political principals under whom they serve, whether within
the agency's own leadership, in Congress, or in the White House. The levers of political control can take
many forms, ranging from appropriations funding and direct oversight to informal threats or pressure to
elicit cooperation.
75. Some examples of recent bureaucratic incorporation scholarship include Michael Jones-
Correa, Race to the Top? The Politics of Immigrant Education in Suburbia, in NEW FACES IN NEW
PLACES 308 (Douglas S. Massey ed., 2008); Helen B. Marrow, Immigrant Bureaucratic Incorporation:
The Dual Roles of Professional Missions and Government Policies, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 756 (2009);
HELEN MARROW, NEW DESTINATION DREAMING: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND LEGAL STATUS IN THE
RURAL AMERICAN SOUTH (2011); Paul G. Lewis & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Police Practices in
Immigrant-Destination Cities: Political Control or Bureaucratic Professionalism?, 42 URB. AFFAIRS
REV. 874 (2007); Paul G. Lewis et al., Why Do (Some) City Police Departments Enforce Federal
Immigration Law? Political, Demographic, And Organizational Influences On Local Choices, J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY (2012).
76. Bosniak, supra note 68; Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and
Postnational Membership in Europe, 24 CONTEMPORARY SOC. 326 (1995).
77. Although she was not writing in the context of immigration, feminist scholar Judith Shklar
wrote that work was the basis of citizenship. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST
FOR INCLUSION (1991). Similar notions underlie a vast legal scholarship on the intersection of
immigration law, labor law, and employment law that includes Jennifer Gordon, Michael Wishnie, and
many others. See supra notes 3-4.
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workplace protections protect all workers from unsafe conditions, unfair
wages, and discrimination on the basis of statutorily enumerated classes."
Theorists of bureaucratic incorporation suggest that one alternative to
relying on Congress or courts to protect immigrant workers is looking to
regulatory agencies charged with enforcing labor and employment laws.
More specifically, bureaucracy scholars seek to explain the behaviors of
civil servants and street-level bureaucrats working to enforce statutes and
case law and to implement administrative policies in their daily work."
Many everyday law enforcement tasks occur in agencies vested with
responsibility to implement statutes that call on exercises of bureaucratic
discretion and expertise. In the open spaces and ambiguities within these
laws, agencies must set their own priorities. Scholars in political science
and administrative law have long written about the central place of
discretion in policy implementationso although only recently in the
immigrant context.81 Bureaucratic discretion results from a confluence of
factors, including public-spiritedness, an ethic of professionalism, rational
self-interest, and political control exerted by elected leadership.82
In the context of regulatory agencies with mandates to enforce specific
statutes, the tension between politics and legal professionalism provides a
focal point for understanding the motivations of career civil servants.
These conflicts frequently arise when agencies share "regulatory space."
Shared regulatory space can take the form of overlapping agency functions;
78. But as Part I explained, Congress severely limited or stripped many economic rights from
undocumented workers (in IRCA and its progeny) and the Supreme Court interpreted at least one
important labor law to provide narrowly for immigrants (in Hoffman).
79. See supra note 75.
80. Two prominent bureaucracy scholars writing at the intersection of law and political science
are KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188 (1969) and JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 49 (1985) (characterizing bureaucratic
rationality as searching for the good within the constraints of the possible). Other political scientists
writing on this topic include Ken J. Meier, Joseph Stewart, Jr. & Robert F. England, Politics of
Bureaucratic Discretion: Educational Access as Urban Service, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 155 (1991); Lael R.
Keiser, State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare Programs, 9 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 87 (1999); GARY BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1987).
81. A recent article by Jill Family summarizes administrative law scholarship relevant to
immigration law. Family, supra note 11. Her piece triggered lengthy discussion about sub-regulatory
guidance among important immigration scholars on "immprof," a widely-subscribed list-serve for
immigration law professors. Among the types of guidance catalogued with varying degrees of
precedential value: policy guidance, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) adjudication,
memoranda of understanding and agency correspondence, practice manuals, and operating instructions.
For an earlier example of the DHS predecessor, see Janet A. Gilboy, Administrative Review in a System
ofConflicting Values, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 515 (1988) (discussing immigrant bail administration in
detention).
82. MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2000).
83. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012).
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related jurisdictional assignments; interacting jurisdictional assignments;
and delegations requiring concurrence. Similar conflicts can also exist
within agencies that must advance multiple goals or that are tasked with
enforcing multiple statutes in tension with one another.84 In each scenario,
how to do "the right thing" is not clear: bureaucrats must engage in
statutory interpretation when exercising discretion and implementing their
competing mandates."
B. Conflicting Mandates in Complex Regulatory Arenas:
Professionalism and/or Politics?
How do bureaucrats exercise their discretion when confronted with
competing mandates? There are two dominant answers in the relevant
literatures: political control and professionalism. The political control
perspective suggests that political controversies about immigration in the
post-Hoffman era, for example, will lead toward punitive enforcement
practices and a lack of support in service delivery from governmental
agencies." There are several reasons for these outcomes: undocumented
immigrants' powerlessness in electoral politics; the power of interest groups
such as employers within corporations and trade associations prone to
capturing agencies; and the tendency for principals to bring bureaucrats in
line." Political control thereby defrays a mission-focused professional
ethos that includes fidelity to substantive laws, such as labor standards or
antidiscrimination or inclusiveness." Underlying this perspective is an
implicit belief that policy is rational and therefore strategically directed at
accomplishing instrumental ends.89 In Graham Alison's typology, this
model of government behavior infers that if a government official
performed a particular action, that official must have felt the action
84. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009).
85. The terms "bureaucrats," "civil servants," and "career attorneys" are used interchangeably
throughout this article because they refer to similar concepts in legal scholarship and social science
literature. In particular, "bureaucrat" is used as a term of art in political science; it is not a pejorative
term as it sometimes is in common parlance.
86. Lewis & Ramakrisbnan, supra note 75, at 877 ("At the national level, much of the literature
suggests that political control of the bureaucracy is significant. Researchers have found, for example,
that political shifts, such as changes in presidential administrations, have led to important changes in
bureaucratic priorities and enforcement efforts.") (citing B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN,
BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (1994); Terry M. Moe, The
Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATION THEORY:
FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 116 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995)).
87. Lewis & Ramakrishnan, supra note 75, at 879.
88. See id.
89. On public choice as it relates to public interest law specifically, see STEVEN P. CROLEY,
REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008).
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represented the best way of accomplish a desired end.90 Revealing the
strategic thinking that leads linearly from means to ends, then, is the key to
understanding why a policy is enacted." In the context of understanding
the federal government's policies toward undocumented workers, one must
seek to understand: (1) the values and objectives of the federal government
(i.e., deterring unauthorized migration by staunching employment of
undocumented immigrant workers); (2) the perceived policy alternatives
(i.e., punishing employers for hiring undocumented workers, rather than the
immigrants themselves); (3) the range of intentional and unintentional
consequences that can flow from each policy alternative (i.e., not punishing
employers to keep the onus of responsibility on workers and to prevent
unjust enrichment of workers); and (4) the net value of each set of policy
consequences. 92 A corollary interpretation of federal workplace agencies
protecting undocumented workers would follow the same line of analysis
with the starting assumption that the workplace agencies' objective is to
maintain labor compliance for all workers and that ensuring compliance for
U.S. citizen workers requires simultaneously ensuring compliance for
noncitizen workers.
In contrast, social scientists who focus on the influence of
professionalism over political control emphasize the "cultural" attributes of
the organizations in which the professionals reside. 93 Those theorists of
professionalism who focus on professionals within government
bureaucracies begin by recognizing that the government consists of a
confederation of "semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a life
of its own." 94 Those organizations follow set "repertoires" when taking
action; these repertoires are often fueled by their organizational imperatives
and manifested in a "fixed set of standard operating procedures." 95 Policies
and practices are analyzed as organizational outputs. 96  Bureaucratic
90. Alison, supra note 65 (contrasting rational choice theory with organizational process and
bureaucratic politics models. The model presumed in this article approximates bureaucratic politics).
Examples of rational choice include Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The
Case of the NLRB, 79 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 1094 (1985) (using quantitative analysis to determine factors
driving agency behavior and concluding that politics is a significant factor); Barry R. Weingast & Mark
J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal
Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983) (testing competing models of agency behavior and
finding systemic Congressional influence).
91. See Alison, supra note 65, at 693-96.
92. This formulation simplifies and somewhat exaggerates the underlying analytic paradigm for
illustrative purposes. Many proponents will subscribe only implicitly or partially, even if
predominantly.
93. See sources cited within Lewis & Ramakrishnan, supra note 75, at 879-82 (describing the
insulation of bureaucracies from political control in multiple areas of public policy, including policing
and social services).
94. Alison, supra note 65, at 698.
95. Id. at 698, 70 1.
96. Id. at 700.
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incorporation theorists allege that government actors sit on top of the
conglomerate of organizations, and they perceive problems through
"organizational sensors."97 Thus, partisan politics are constrained,
countered and sometimes overcome by the "norms and ethos of civil
servants" within the agencies." In the instance of bureaucrats serving
immigrants from within workplace agencies, an organizational theorist
would say that the motivating ethos is one of professionalism." Most civil
servants trained as attorneys and employed by federal workplace agencies
are "socialized into understanding their role as unelected officials in a
democratic political system where Congress dictates their agency
mission."' Their legal training makes them particularly cognizant of legal
constraints related to the professional norm of procedural justice."o' While
mindful of their political leadership,. they strive to maintain their agency
mandate across changing presidential priorities.'02 Change happens, but it
occurs gradually and infrequently: organizations tend toward "parochial
priorities" such as organizational health, expressed in dollars appropriated
and bodies assigned; attempting higher functions through banal tasks like
preparing budgets and reports; evaluating options in terms of administrative
feasibility; and updating their practices based on past practices, such as
using last year's budget as a template for this year's expenditures.0 3
Organizational parameters mostly persist through recruitment of loyal
personnel, tenure of longstanding employees, and rewards for following
existing procedures.104  More dramatic change occurs in periods of
budgetary feast or fast.' Problems often occur at the juncture of
jurisdictional overlap of multiple organizations and require coordination for
solution. 0 6
97. Id. at 698.
98. See also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 749, 786-87 (2003) (attributing the culture clash between the prosecutor and
government agency relationship to socialization/acculturation at law school and career paths leading to
the current station).
99. See supra note 75. Charles Epp advances a similar notion of "legalized accountability" within
municipal bureaucracies that amounts to a socially constructed paradigm for responding to the threat of
litigation. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF
THE LEGALISTIC STATE (2009).
100. GOLDEN, supra note 82, at 25, 11-12; see also John D. Dilulio, Jr., Principled Agents: The
Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 277,
316 (1994); James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 57 (1987).
101. See GOLDEN, supra note 82.
102. See id.
103. Alison, supra note 65, at 700-01.
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Several recent empirical studies of immigrant-serving law enforcement
agencies demonstrate the professional motivation to serve immigrants
within hostile political climates. Building on foundational work studying
social service delivery to immigrants despite restrictive government
policies,'0 o scholars find that moments when restrictive government policies
collide with bureaucrats' beliefs about fairness and appropriate action
toward their clients most vividly reveal bureaucrats' professional norms.'
Political scientists Paul Lewis and Karthick Ramakrishnan study inclusive
policing practices in cities with many immigrants.109 They contend that
local law enforcement departments increasingly are professional agencies
that use discretion to engage in a search for practices that will help them to
serve the local community in defending itself, rather than mechanically
taking political cues from elected leadership who may view immigration
control as an electoral prerogative in the down economy."' Law
enforcement officials view themselves as public servants and professionals
who follow an ideal of service, and they recognize the importance of the
public they serve in order to do their job well."' Insofar as immigrants are
part of that constituency, local law enforcement relies on them to
accomplish core tasks of keeping the peace, gaining trust in the community,
and maintaining quality of life for all concerned." 2
Sociologist Shannon Gleeson extends the professionalism emphasis in
bureaucratic incorporation theory to state law enforcement and regulation,
where partisan politics are potentially more salient and immigration policies
more fractured than at the local level, in two empirical studies of state-level
workplace agencies."' In one study, she shows that political ideology
107. Michael Jones-Correa studies suburban school districts that have dealt with substantial
immigration and developed the concept of "bureaucratic incorporation" of new groups into the political
system. Jones-Correa, supra note 75. He argued that under certain circumstances, administrators-
whether acting out of a sense of mission, professional norms, or personal ethos-may adopt de facto
policies that advance the interests of groups that are otherwise marginalized in public affairs. See id. at
321-23. Jones-Correa argued that such patterns defy the predictions of political control theory. Id. at
324-25. Electoral considerations were far less relevant than the egalitarian sense of mission of school
superintendents, who viewed their districts' success in a communitarian fashion that linked the fate of
the less fortunate with the majority. See id.
108. See, e.g., Marrow, supra, note 75 at 758-59 (studying bureaucrats engaged in the delivery of
health care services and finding that policy preferences are trumped by "service-oriented professional
norms").
109. Lewis & Ramakrishnan, supra note 75 (disputing political control as explanation for police




113. Shannon Gleeson, Assistant Professor, Latin American and Latino Studies, University of
California, Santa Cruz, presentation at the University of California, Irvine Immigration Symposium: "To
Protect One, We Must Protect All": Bureaucratic Scripts for Protecting Undocumented Workers (Feb.
17, 2011) [hereinafter Gleeson, Bureaucratic Scripts], available at
http://leam.uci.edu/ocw/courses/lOw/UCtImmigration-LawSymposium.php?panel=6&start-2943;
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remains an insignificant part of bureaucrats' motivation to serve
immigrants.114  When asked to reflect on the moral worthiness of
immigrants who receive their services, state-level officials in the EEOC and
DOL responded that the moral worthiness of their immigrant clients is
irrelevant to their rendering of services, regardless of the immigrants'
official eligibility for those services."' "Doing the right thing," Gleeson
argues, "can sometimes have little to do with a bureaucrat's personal sense
of conviction towards a client.""' Instead, Gleeson offers an
institutionalized account for why bureaucrats promote immigrants' rights:
"in addition to exercising discretion and pursuing creative solutions,"
bureaucratic actions are contingent on 'predictable and institutionalized
practices.""' 7 Although agency staff was sometimes sympathetic to
immigrants, overwhelmingly they articulated their commitment to
immigrants as a means to achieve organizational goals such as resource
allocation and labor compliance."' Gleeson's research design, which
compares regulation of the workplace in liberal California with
conservative Texas, shows that political pressure is constrained by
professionalism: service to immigrants was available in both jurisdictions
and did not depend on heroic actions or pro-immigrant advocacy on the part
of individual bureaucrats.l'
C. Bureaucratic Politics in Federal Workplace Agencies
This Article unites elements of the political control and
professionalism models into a model of bureaucratic politics that takes into
account both the influence of politics and the constraints of professionalism.
It argues that while individuals within a conglomerate of organizations
follow set "repertoires" when taking action, those repertoires exist within a
complex regulatory context that is partially established by the political
leadership of an agency sitting atop the organization, and partially
established by the competing pressures within the regulatory arena (e.g.,
career civil servants, Congress, lobbyists, and industry groups). 20 The
see also Shannon Gleeson, Means to An End: An Assessment of the Status-Blind Approach to
Protecting Undocumented Worker Rights [hereinafter Gleeson, Status-Blind Approach] (unpublished
manuscript).
114. Gleeson, Bureaucratic Scripts, supra note 113.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gleeson, Status-Blind Approach, supra note 113 at 3.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 13-17. For a fuller statement of this argument, see SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING
COMMITMENTS: THE POLITICS OF ENFORCING IMMIGRANT WORKER RIGHTS IN SAN JOSE AND HOUSTON
(2012) (arguing that pro-immigrant policies persist among bureaucrats in Texas and California despite
the comparatively more conservative political context in Texas).
120. Cf DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REPUTATION AT THE FDA (2010) [hereinafter CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
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leaders within this tier of decision-makers are far from monolithic; each is a
player in its own bargains and dilemmas.121 Bureaucratic politics exists
between many actors who are not organized by a single strategic issue but
rather by diverse problems and a range of personal, organizational, and
policy goals.122  Many of those goals are determined by the role of the
individual within the larger organization.
This is where Miles' law, cited in the article title, once again comes in:
where you stand on immigration policy depends on where you sit within the
government bureaucracy. 23  The occupational position of a cabinet
secretary or commission member - both politically appointed leadership
positions - produces different perspectives on policy outcomes than the
position of a career civil servant within the agency. At the same time, the
political leadership and career staff do not operate independently; the
hierarchical nature of the agency's organizational structure lends itself to
some "pulling and hauling."' 24 The results of all the pulling and hauling
sometimes reflect the triumph of one role over another; many times, the
results yield a distinct result from what any individual intended-the result
of a compromise among government officials who see an issue
differently.'2 5
The stakes are raised for law enforcement agencies when bureaucrats
confront apparently conflicting statutes, mixed or multiple agency goals and
missions,126 operate in "shared regulatory space,""2 and internally
experience ambivalence about laws that seem untenable in light of their
professional duties.'2 8 Bureaucrats use their discretion to find gaps in the
law to reconcile the competing mandates with one another and with their
professional commitments.'2 9 They often do so in the "shadow of the
POWER] (describing Carpenter's notion of "bureaucratic autonomy"); see also DANIEL P. CARPENTER,
THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001) [hereinafter CARPENTER, FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY]; Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan's Lawyers and the Dynamics of
Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61 (2009) (describing Teles's notion of "transformative
bureaucracy").
121. This language of game theory is also used in international affairs, where outcomes of
intricate, subtle, simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions of power result
from the hierarchical arrangement of which constitutes the government.
122. See case studies of bureaucratic politics within workplace agencies in Part III.
123. See Miles, supra note 65.
124. Alison, supra note 65, at 707-09.
125. Id.at711.
126. Biber, supra note 84.
127. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 83.
128. Gilboy, supra note 81.
129. Legal scholarship also describes the influence of the regulatory environment on the agency's
willingness to achieve a primary versus a secondary or competing mandate. Many scholars have called
on external agencies to monitor, coordinate, and lobby an agency with a conflicted mandate for the
purpose of strategically enhancing performance of secondary missions, rather than relying on the agency
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law,"o13  given the shared sense of authority and legitimacy afforded by the
law to each of the players in these institutions.
Discretion can run both ways, of course: the kinds of "administrative
defections" reported in several of the immigrant-serving agency case
studies occur when civil servants see the law in question as particularly
unsustainable or non-viable.' 3' Political scientist Melissa Golden
demonstrates career attorneys' accountability within four types of
regulatory agencies in the civil rights arena.13 2 Her case study of the U.S.
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ) during the Reagan
administration shows that the DOJ attorneys felt obligated to voice
opposition to Reagan's appointees when their orders departed from the
purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 or compromised its primary
beneficiaries, rather than unquestioningly support their political
leadership."' Their loyalty was to legal principle over politics and to
vigorous representation of their client-the regulatory agency for whom
they worked.' 34 This professional code of conduct influenced their desire to
"do the right thing" as well as their definition of the "right thing."' 35
Whereas the civil servants in agencies with few lawyers tended to be more
responsive to the political leadership than the civil servants in agencies
dominated by lawyers, the DOJ attorneys exhibited qualities indicative of
their legal training and focus on presenting arguments in their daily work
itself to force a change in priorities. Freeman and Rossi recommend coordination to overcome collective
actions problems in four types of shared space: overlapping agency functions, related jurisdictional
assignments, interacting jurisdictional assignments, and delegations requiring concurrence. See Freeman
& Rossi, supra note 83. Separately, Biber promotes interagency monitoring to facilitate agency success
on multiple goals. See Biber, supra note 84. Biber's study of the Environmental Protection Agency
posits that because intra-agency efforts to improve performance on secondary goals have limitations,
inter-agency efforts such as policing agency decision-making to ensure compliance with performance on
an undervalued goal or making legally binding determinations about whether the decision-making
agency has met minimum standards for that undervalued goal have greater impact. Id.
130. This phrase is frequently used in socio-legal research and originated in Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950
(1979).
131. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, DtFECTION ET PRISE DE PAROLE: THtORIE ET APPLICATIONS
(1995). Thanks to Leila Kawar for the suggestion of this phrase.
132. GOLDEN, supra note 82.
133. Id. at 101-06 (DOJ case study and analysis). Reagan reversed the direction of the civil rights
policy agenda taken by three decades of Republican and Democratic administrations. Id. Norman
Amaker said: "The record of none of them (including that of Richard Nixon) manifested a tendency to
subvert in any fundamental way the protective goals of the civil rights laws." NORMAN C. AMAKER,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1988). In comparison, Reagan rolled back the
protective goals of civil rights laws "in a fundamental sense" by seeking to eliminate affirmative action,
to eliminate school busing, and even to limit the long-standing policy of redressing discriminatory
practices to cases of proven intent. Id. Golden finds that the administrative implementation of his
policies was consistent with these policy goals, but it was not for lack of effort to voice opposition by
the civil servants within the DOJ. See GOLDEN, supra note 82
134. GOLDEN, supra note 82.
135. Id.
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and in the midst of conflict.136  Golden's findings echo more general
findings from organizational sociologists who study agency culture 37 and
from the bureaucracy scholars who cite the dominant professional ethos as
vital to understanding the motivations of bureaucrats. '
D. Research Method: Comparative Case Studies ofFederal Workplace
Agencies
This Article focuses on regulation of the workplace, because this
policy domain presents an important instance of two vulnerable, highly
interconnected populations-immigrants and low-wage workers-bisected
by politics, clashing laws, and agency missions. 13 Consistent with the
bureaucratic incorporation theorists and counter to the political control
theorists, this Article predicts that civil servants will resist rights and
restrictions epitomized by Hoffman and its anti-immigrant context in favor
of a more inclusive professional ethos governed by the protection of
workers and the enforcement of labor and employment laws. To separate
the confounding influence of state laws and state policy contexts, this
Article focuses on federal workplace agencies administering parallel federal
labor and employment statutes. This federal concentration brings
136. See id. at 27 (describing findings in a subsequent chapter titled "lawyers who love to argue").
The other case studies included scientists in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the
Food and Nutrition Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Id.
137. Literature examining the role of agency culture demonstrates that the norms, beliefs,
practices, and values shared by members of organizations shape both their behavior and their decisions.
Organizational sociologists such as Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio claim that the forces animating
private organizations, including competition for resources and perceptions of legitimacy, present
themselves in a wide array of institutions. See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYsIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); cf Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher
Uggen, Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedure as Rational
Myth, 105 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 406 (1999) (suggesting that organizations and professions strive to
construct rational responses to law that are themselves modeled after public legal order or reflective of
market values such as reducing costs); Lauren B. Edelman, Linda H. Krieger, Scott R. Eliason,
Catherine R. Albiston & Virginia Mellema, When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to
Institutionalized Employment Structures (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that organizational
structures and practices serve symbolic functions to signal organizational compliance and that those
symbols feed back into judicial conceptions of legal compliance). A prominent political scientist who
emphasizes organizational reputation as a factor in bureaucratic autonomy is Daniel Carpenter, who
provides in-depth studies of policy innovation in New Deal executive agencies and the Food and Drug
Administration. See CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 120; CARPENTER, FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, supra note 120.
138. See text accompanying notes 94-119.
139. This identified conflict between work-immigration missions magnifies the internal conflicts
in the immigration bureaucracy studied by Janet Gilboy, Kitty Calavita, and Stephen Lee. See Janet A.
Gilboy, supra note 81; KiTry CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION,
AND THE I.N.S. (1992) (discussing the INS during the Bracero Program); Lee, supra note 4 (discussing
DOL-DHS workplace raids). Whereas Lee says that DHS's mission will usually trump the DOL's labor
mission due to power asymmetries, my argument is that within the overlap there is space for workplace
agencies to exercise discretion in favor of immigrant workers. See Lee, supra note 4.
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methodological advantages, but it does overly simplify the regulatory
environment during a time when states have asserted their interventions into
immigrants' rights; it briefly mentions state regulation in Part IV, but
mostly leaves the consideration of state regulation to future study. 140 In the
meantime, this Article portends to find similar patterns of bureaucratic
thinking and behavior in state and federal workplace agencies: so long as
they are not decisively prohibited by federal statute or case law,
organizational imperatives to enforce labor and employment laws should
support a favorable exercise of discretion on behalf of immigrant workers.
This finding should hold true even in the face of changing presidential
administrations if the organizational ethos and professional mission
determine agency decision-making more than partisan politics.
Unlike much immigration scholarship that uses case studies of
individual agencies, this Article studies institutional dynamics across three
similarly-situated workplace agencies: the DOL, NLRB, and EEOC.'4 '
This research design allows for observation of variation across agencies that
each confront the same conundrum of reconciling their statutorily mandated
labor enforcement charge with immigration enforcement strategies that
originate elsewhere in the administration. Also, in order to gain further
traction on the influence of political leadership on career staff and the
insulation of bureaucratic discretion from political considerations, the
Article studies civil servants in two independent agencies led by bipartisan
commissions and in one executive agency headed by a cabinet-level
secretary. Based on the theory that politics is not paramount, this Article
would expect less influence from politics on career staff than politically
appointed leadership, particularly those career staff who have remained in
their positions across Republican and Democratic administrations. To the
extent that political influence affects enforcement activities, the Article
would expect negligible differences in the degree of influence on
bureaucratic attitudes toward immigrant workers despite variation in
institutional design, if politics is not the motivating factor.
The research design is hypothesis-generating instead of hypothesis-
testing. That is, it does not so much choose between the two dominant
explanations for bureaucratic behavior as draw on both traditions to suggest
ways to understand the comparative case studies of workforce agencies
140. One limitation of Gleeson's very well-considered research design is that state legislation and
case law can confound the regulatory environment of the workplace agencies. See Gleeson, Status-
Blind Approach, supra note 113. That is, it is difficult to parse the extent to which the California EEOC
is motivated by its own organizational ethos independent of highly-protective state employment laws
such as FEHA that demand more than the federal minimum. See id.
141. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4 (studying the DOL-DHS pairing); Griffith, supra note 4 (studying
the DHS-EEOC pairing); Fine & Gordon, supra note 4; Gleeson, Status-Blind Approach, supra note
113115 (studying the DOL-workplace agency pairing); CALAVITA, supra note 139 (studying the INS
predecessor to the DHS).
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protecting immigrant workers in complex regulatory arenas. For the same
reason, the interviews and documentation evidencing the more general
propositions should be read to illustrate processes and motivations, rather
than as hard proof of causal inferences.' 42 The Article contends that both
politics and professionalism matter: politics creates openings and
professionalism constrains the exercise of discretion. Importantly, while
the claim that politics matters less than commonly believed-or at least in
different ways than commonly believed (i.e., not the naked assertion of
policy preferences), the research design does not counter the hypothesis that
regulatory resistance is at least partly conditioned on political preferences.
That said, the time period studied covers two presidential administrations
with markedly different approaches to immigration enforcement during a
politically divisive time. Since Hoffman in 2002, a Republican and a
Democratic president have had opportunities to respond directly and
indirectly to tensions between immigration and labor enforcement.
Presidents appoint the top leadership in the workplace agencies, who
conduct their activities mindful of presidential policy. The leadership will
inevitably influence the federal career staff working below them, even if the
staff are partially insulated by civil servant protections. The integrated
explanation for agency behavior advanced is not mutually exclusive with all
political influence, though the Article expects to find evidence of regulatory
resistance that constrains politics across administrations and across
workplace agencies, if organizational factors and professional ethos are also
at play.
III.
CASE STUDIES OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN FEDERAL WORKPLACE
AGENCIES
Part III draws on three case studies of federal workplace enforcement
agencies-the NLRB, the DOL, and the EEOC-to show how civil
servants work from within their professional and statutory mandates to
advance immigrant worker rights, despite the Hoffman precedent and
changing presidential administrations. To obtain accurate perspectives on
the exercise of discretion, the author interviewed high-level agency officials
in the Washington, D.C., headquarters for each federal agency who had
sufficient authority to make decisions and who participated in the formation
of regulatory responses to Hoffman. In each agency, the author interviewed
three or more career staff members in the policymaking and enforcement
arms (usually in subdivisions of the Office of General Counsel) and
142. For more explanation of non-causal inference and qualitative research methods, see HENRY
BRADY AND DAVID COLLIER, RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS
(2010).
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reviewed extensive documentation of the agency's internal practices and
perspectives. While the interviews were conducted in 2011 and 2012, the
staffers held their career positions throughout multiple administrations-
often fifteen years or more-and were familiar with the political climate
immediately preceding and following Hoffman. Documents from 1986 (the
passage of IRCA) to the present were reviewed as both "window[s] into
the.. .outlook[s] and attitude[s]" of agency officialsl43 and current
interpretations of law, including both regulations and sub-regulatory
guidance such as policy, fact sheets, memoranda of understanding, opinion
letters, and practice manuals. The author also interviewed immigration
attorneys in several national advocacy groups familiar with the work of
these agencies, seeking external perceptions of the agencies' motivations,
their openness to policy change, and their reputations for pro- or anti-
immigrant leanings.
The case studies show that the specific forms, the direction, and the
degree of regulatory response vary with the agency's statutory mandate and
institutional design. This variance is to be expected. However, across
variation, the institutional dynamics of influence remain roughly the same
and support bringing politics and professionalism together into a model of
bureaucratic politics. To foreshadow the pattern discerned in these in-depth
case studies-that is, highlighting the forest for the trees-the
organizational behaviors of the three workplace agencies can be arrayed
along a spectrum of regulatory resistance ranging from near refusals to
enforce the law to reluctant acquiescence, with all three agencies arguing
against the spirit of Hoffman from within the letter of the law. I label these
responses "reconfiguring" (NLRB), "buffering" (DOL), and "mitigating"
(EEOC) respectively. Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes the strategies of
resistance undertaken by regulatory agencies. Details of the regulatory
responses are elaborated in the in-depth case studies occupying the
remainder of this section and more systematically compared in Part IV. 144
A. The NLRB follows Hoffman insofar as its discretion on backpay is
constrained, but it "reconfigures" other remedies for immigrant
143. Family, supra note 11, at 589.
144. Jed Barnes and Tom Burke coin the concept of organizational "rights practices" that could be
used to describe the regulatory responses described in this article, although they are primarily concerned
with private organizations. As the authors explain, the consequences of law depend on the extent to
which law filters into the "nooks and crannies" of social life." See Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The
Difusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
493, 494 (2006). In Barnes and Burke's schema, rights practices vary along two dimensions: the degree
to which the organizations are proactive (anticipating problems) versus reactive, and the degree to which
the organizations are minimalist (seeking only to meet basic legal requirements.) Id. at 505-14 & Table
3.
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workers where openings permit.
Of the three agencies under study, the NLRB experienced the greatest
constraints and the least openness from Hoffman.'45 The decision, after all,
directly challenged the Board's ruling on the availability of backpay to
immigrant workers under the NLRA.'46 As a matter of law, the NLRB's
interpretation of its legal mandate to protect workers clearly and
unavoidably conflicted with the Supreme Court's legal interpretation.147 As
a matter of policy, the NLRB faced some of the staunchest challenges as
well. Therefore, this first case study poses the most important illustration
of bureaucratic discretion operating in favor of undocumented immigrant
workers. The NLRB's dual commitment to professionalism and the rule of
law in the challenging legal and political climate in which it found itself
functions as a strong case of the Article's theory. The case study begins by
explaining the challenging regulatory environment surrounding the Board's
interpretations of worker rights and remedies to Hoffman. It then delves
into interviews and guidance documents to demonstrate the interplay of
professionalism and politics as civil servants navigated this difficult terrain.
Two decades before Hoffman, the Supreme Court held that
undocumented workers are covered by protections of the NLRA in Sure-
Tan v. NLRB.148 In Sure-Tan, the president of a leather processing firm
objected to union organizing because six of the seven employees
representing the union were undocumented.'49 When the NLRB overruled
this objection, the employer wrote to the INS asking that the agency check
the status of the employees."'o The INS arrested the workers, five of whom
voluntarily departed the country to avoid deportation.'"' The NLRB issued
a complaint and ultimately ruled that the employers' retaliatory call to the
INS constituted constructive discharge in violation of the NLRA. The
Board entered a cease-and-desist order with the conventional remedies of
reinstatement and backpay.'52 The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Supreme
Court affirmed the merits analysis and partly remanded the remedial
145. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
146. Id. at 149-50.
147. See id. at 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he immigration law foresees application of the
Nation's labor laws to protect 'workers who are illegal immigrants.' And a policy of applying the labor
laws must encompass a policy of enforcing the labor laws effectively. Otherwise, . . . 'we would leave
helpless the very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer practices."') (quoting
NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, L-, concurring)) (emphasis in
original).
148. Sure Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
149. Id. at 886-87.
150. Id. at 887.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 888.
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analysis, leaving questions of implementation to the NLRB.'13  A career
attorney in the Office of General Counsel who had worked in the Advice
Division explained that "Sure-Tan remains good law" and the NLRB has
held to its "mantra" of not asking about status so that it will not interfere
with its primary statutory mandate to enforce labor standards.154
In 2002, shortly after the Supreme Court reversed the NLRB
enforcement order in Hoffman,'" the NLRB General Counsel Arthur
Rosenfeld sent its Regional Directors a memorandum setting forth
procedural remedies for employees who may be undocumented aliens.' 6 "51
The 2002 General Counsel memo (GC memo 02-06) shored up support for
"several basic principles" left intact after Hoffman-including the starting
presumption that employees and employers have conformed to the law, so
that the Board is not obligated to conduct a sua sponte immigration
investigation. The memo also retained as "valuable and necessary" the use
of cease and desist orders, contempt sanctions, and formal settlements
aimed at deterring "recurrence or extension of unfair labor practices" in the
absence of backpay remedies.' GC memo 02-06 acknowledged that after
Hoffman, the NLRB could no longer seek backpay remedies "once evidence
establishes that a discriminatee is not authorized to work during the
backpay period." As an NLRB General Counsel staff attorney explained,
"Hoffman complicated matters quite a bit" for the NLRB. From the vantage
point of the career staff, Hoffman proved "troubling" for the NLRB's ability
to ensure compliance with the NLRA, because "employers have the
opportunity to evade remedies for violating the law."'59 Without avenues
for legal accountability, the challenge for staff became to determine what
153. Id. at 889-90, 906.
154. Telephone Interview with NLRB Office of General Counsel (Jan. 12, 2012).
155. The NLRB's prior stance on undocumented worker remedies is set out in its Petitioner's brief
before the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Final Brief for Respondent,
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1570), 1999 WL
34814373.
156. The general counsel position is politically appointed. However, many of the memoranda
carrying the name of the GC are influenced or written by the counsel's civil servant staff.
157. Memorandum from Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Regional Directors,
Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers, NLRB (July 19, 2002) ("Procedures and Remedies for
Discriminatees Who May be Undocumented Aliens after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc."). The
memo displaced General Counsel Memorandum GC 98-15 (Dec. 4, 1998).
158. Among the good law that remains after Hoffman is the coverage of undocumented immigrants
as employees under the NLRA, the irrelevance of immigration status for findings of employer liability,
and the irrelevance of immigration status for union eligibility. A litany of other protective measures are
built into their procedures and affirmed in subsequent memoranda GC 11-62 (June 7, 2011), including
the presumption of legality, refusal to conduct sua sponte investigations into status and instead to defer
such investigations to the remedial stage. Richard Siegel, Associate General Counsel NLRB to Regional
Directors 1-2, 4 (June 7, 2011), available at
http:mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458049525b ("Updated Procedures in Addressing
Immigration Status Issues that Arise During NLRB Proceedings").
159. Telephone Interview, supra note 154.
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avenues for remedies remained available for the execution of the agency's
statutory and professional duties.
In order to coordinate responses to undocumented worker complaints
arising in this unsettled legal terrain, a June 2011 General Counsel memo
directs NLRB regional staff to "call home"-that is, to contact the Deputy
Assistant General Counsel-in cases indicating an employer taking
advantage of immigration status issues in an attempt to circumvent fair
labor practices.' The Deputy Assistant General Counsel, a career attorney
who reports to the Director of Operations-Management, is tasked with
supporting regional enforcement offices' efforts at every stage of case
processing, from investigation to litigation to remedies.' 6 ' Following
Hoffman, the Deputy Assistant General Counsel sought to "figure out where
conflict does not exist [between immigration and labor enforcement] -Or
to find opportunities where agencies can be of mutual assistance in light of
their statutory mandates and available remedies." 62 One possibility was to
focus on unlawful retaliation. Given that retaliatory threats to deport
directly interfere with the labor enforcement mission of the NLRB, the
Deputy Assistant General Counsel considered retaliation a valid opening to
reach undocumented workers.163
A second possibility was to focus on equitable remedies for the barriers
undocumented workers faced to monetary recovery. The General Counsel
identified problematic cases where the employer is willing to acknowledge
wrongdoing and settle but finds out, incidentally, that the worker lacks
status. The employer cannot keep the worker on payroll (if she is still in his
employ) and cannot reinstate her (if she already has been let go) under
IRCA, despite the employer's desire to rectify wrongdoing. The Deputy
Assistant General Counsel reached out to other agencies, asking if there
was a way to protect workers by giving status and rendering workers
eligible for the full panoply of remedies under the NLRA within our limited
parameters. Looking to existing laws and policies in other agencies, he
advised the General Counsel on ways to request from DHS deferred action
or favorable discretion for workers who are necessary for labor enforcement
activities and have been subjected to removal for retaliatory reasons. He
also collected information from the EEOC about best practices for seeking
U-visas on behalf of victimized workers, which can provide temporary
work authorization, family member visas, and a path to becoming a lawful
160. Siegel, supra note 158. The Updated Procedures Memo was issued in response to a
reorganization of immigration-related responsibilities into three agencies within the Department of
Homeland Security: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and in consultation with an Interagency
Worksite Enforcement Coordination Committee. See Telephone Interview, supra note 154.
161. Siegel, supra note 158.
162. Id.
163. Accord Saucedo, supra note 58, at 925 (citing U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988)).
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permanent resident.'" These status-based measures deviate from NRLB's
usual practice of ignoring status; when prompted, these measures instead
attempt to correct the status issue to get back to the labor compliance issues
that are clearly their responsibility.
The Deputy Assistant General Counsel openly acknowledges that he
took initiative on behalf of immigrant workers in his pursuit of retaliatory
deportation and U-visa certification. He felt "a great sense of desire to do
the right thing" and had a particular "appetite" to help undocumented
workers.' 65 It was those two desires, combined with a sense that the
politically appointed General Counsel welcomed his ideas and influenced
his decision to take initiative. The Deputy Assistant General Counsel
explains that there have always been immigration matters in labor. "But
since Hoffman and the increased [public] attention to immigration, it
seemed like a concerted effort needed to be made to develop a response. I
was able to convince [the General Counsel] that we needed to take
ownership of the issue."' 66 Undoubtedly, the Deputy Assistant General
Counsel particularly cares about immigrants' rights. One of his colleagues
said of him, "You get people like [the Deputy Assistant General Counsel],
who have a particular interest in immigrants' rights. He carves time out of
every day to work on immigration-related issues."' 67 Still, the way that the
Deputy Assistant General Counsel describes his own commitment is
encased in the professional responsibility to protect employee rights across
the board, and he does not feel that his perception is distinctive among his
colleagues in Operations-Management. Special responsibilities for
immigration are possible only because "Operations-Management has a
general charge to make things run better,""' which he described as
ranging-from supporting staff in the field who deal with compliance on a
daily basis to more mundane activities that make the trains run on time.
"So we have more freedom" [than other branches].'"' The breadth of this
charge permits the Division to do more in their professional capacity than a
strictly bounded legal office would allow. Moreover, without a nurturing
culture and adequate resources, it would be infeasible for anyone to make a
meaningful difference for undocumented workers. While the Deputy
Assistant General Counsel was willing to accept some credit for the
advances on behalf of undocumented workers, he concluded that "initiative
for undocumented workers would have occurred without me."170  The
164. More extensive discussion of the U-visa remedy appears in the EEOC case study, infra, Part
111(C).
165. E-mail from NLRB Office of General Counsel (Mar. 21, 2012) (on file with author).
166. Phone interview with NLRB Office of General Counsel (Jan. 12, 2012).
167. Telephone Interview with NLRB Office of General Counsel (Jan. 12, 2012).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. E-mail from NLRB Office of General Counsel (Mar. 12, 2012).
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conditions were in place for agency action that would advance the rights of
undocumented workers.
Two career attorneys in the director's office, assigned to work with the
Deputy Assistant on immigration issues, went even further to frame their
responsibility in terms of professional commitment, rather than politics or
personal conviction. With considerable self-awareness, one attorney said
that he and his colleagues are not engaging in advocacy for immigrants'
rights. Instead, they aim to "define or divine the mission of the agency and
figure out how to make it work. We all know a lot about the NLRA and
little about anything else." "' Based on an extensive knowledge of the
history and purposes of the NLRA, he said that things "break down" when
employers feel they can violate employees with impunity - by hiring and
firing undocumented workers or by threatening or discriminating against
them-so when the agency tries to compel compliance with federal
workplace law "it's just a matter of trying to figure out how to serve [the
agency's] mission in a constrained environment." The attorney credited
agency culture to inculcating a common desire among his colleagues to
extend the NLRA's protections: "Individuals share a focus here and there,
but all of us are committed to extend the Act's protections to as wide a
community as possible." 72
The continuing vitality of the NLRB immigration work remains to be
seen, as considerable fluctuation has occurred in the legal and political
context surrounding worker remedies under the NLRA. The 2011 General
Counsel memoranda pushing back against Hoffman became possible under
a politically appointed General Counsel receptive to the suggestions of the
high-level career attorneys in Operations-Management during a period of
quiet among the Board members. Shortly after the most recent issuance, a
case that presented similar facts to Hoffman resurrected the issue of
remedial authority. Without acknowledging the 2011 General Counsel
memo, the NLRB decided in Mezonos Maven Bakery that Hoffman stripped
the Board of discretion to award backpay to an undocumented worker, even
when the employer knowingly hired the workers without regard to their
status. '7 In Mezonos, seven immigrants were hired to work for Mezonos
Maven Bakery without being asked for documentation when they were
hired.174 Eight years later, they were fired after complaining as a group
171. Telephone Interview with NLRB Office of General Counsel staff (Jan. 11, 2012).
172. Id.
173. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 47 (Aug. 9, 2011). Additionally, the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (now Latino Justice PRLDEF) filed a Motion for
Consideration with the Board, and the Motion was denied. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration,
357 NLRB No. 47 (Nov. 3, 2011), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45806f395e.
174. 357 NLRB No. 47, at *1.
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about treatment they were receiving from a supervisor."17  They filed unfair
labor practice charges, the Board issued an unpublished decision on behalf
of the workers, and the parties settled.'76  As part of the settlement, the
Board ordered Mezonos to offer reinstatement and to make the employees
whole for lost wages and benefits.' 7 ' The Board's order was enforced by
the Second Circuit.17 1 Mezonos later argued that it could not offer
reinstatement or backpay under Hoffman because the workers were
undocumented and, thus, unavailable to work.'7 1 On November 1, 2006,
Administrative Law Judge Steven Davis distinguished Hoffman and
decided against the employer."' The ALJ faulted the employer for failing
to verify the workers' legal status in Mezonos, unlike the employers
presented with fraudulent work documents in Hoffman.'"'
The employers appealed the ALJ's ruling, and this time the NLRB
found that Hoffman applied.8 2  A three-member panel of the NLRB
consisting of Wilma Liebman, Mark Pearce, and Brian Hayes announced
that Hoffman compelled the Board to conclude that it lacks the remedial
authority to award backpay to undocumented immigrant workers whose
rights have been violated under the NLRA.' Put another way, in Mezonos,
the NLRB recognized that legal precedent rescinded the agency's discretion
to make findings beyond settled law.'84  This modest protection for
immigrant workers may seem anomalous with the prior case studies of
regulatory resistance. However, it comports with the prior case studies
insofar as the NLRB attorneys struggled to reconcile their competing
professional commitments to protect workers, on the one hand, and to obey






180. Id. at *1-2.
181. Id. at *2.
182. More early background provided in NILC article, see Monica Guizar, Employer That
Knowingly Violated 1-9 Requirement Ordered to Pay "Back Pay," 21 IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS UPDATE 6
(July 20, 2007) (revised June 12, 2008), available at
http://v2011.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/emprights/emprightsl04.htm. NILC is party to the case.
183. 357 NLRB No. 47, at 4 ("We are persuaded that the Court's opinion in Hoffman forecloses
back pay awards for undocumented workers regardless of the circumstances of their hire.")
184. The Board said, "Regardless of the merits . . . we are not at liberty to disregard the Court's
decision in Hoffman." Id. Although the Mezonos opinion was unanimous, the opinion reveals division
within the Board. The concurring opinion, signed by two of the three board members, suggests that the
legal constraint posed by Hoffman would have deleterious policy effects. The majority decision, it
contends, provides employers unjust enrichment for wrongdoing and fails to make employee-victims
whole. It additionally undermines the NRLA's enforcement, chills employees' exercise of Section 7
rights to self-organize, fragments the workforce, and weakens a vital check on immigration law
violators. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 47 (Aug. 9, 2011) (Liebman, J., concurring).
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enforcement agency, its professional duty ultimately collapsed into its legal
duty.
Lamented the General Counsel NLRB attorneys, "[W]hatever small
gaps remained after Hoffman, the Mezonos decision made miniscule ...
[The Mezonos decision] confirms how limited a space we have to work in,
if there was previously any doubt."' That limited space cramped the
possibilities for NLRB staff, but it did not violate the ethos of bureaucratic
accountability to the rule of law and the boundaries of executive power. It
did not definitively prevent NLRB attorneys from reconfiguring their
approach toward enforcement efforts to circumvent the remedial limits of
Hoffman in other legitimate circumstances. The Mezonos decision does not
cite the 2011 General Counsel memo, even though it was released
subsequent to the memo and touched on related questions. However, the
concurring opinion ends with the statement:
In denying back pay to the undocumented workers in this case ... we do
not definitively shut the door on other monetary remedies [that] would
advance Federal labor and immigration policy objectives . . . . [W]e would
be willing to consider in a future case any remedy within our statutory
powers that would prevent an employer that discriminates against
undocumented workers because of their protected activity from being
unjustly enriched by its unlawful conduct.' 86
The General Counsel attorneys reviewing Mezonos were uncertain
about its importance; as of December 2012, no guidance has followed the
Mezonos decision to direct the NLRB's regional field offices on statutory
implementation.
The Spring 2012 NLRB board order in Flaum Appetizing Corp. further
indicates that the pendulum may swing back on the expansion of
immigrants' rights through policy implementation.'" The Board in Flaum
expressed concern about employers engaging in "fishing expeditions" by
using NLRB procedures during compliance hearings to harass or otherwise
raise the issue of status without legitimate reason or basis for doubt. More
specifically, in Flaum, the NLRB determined that employers that
discriminated against employees for engaging in activities protected by the
NLRA must offer sufficient evidence that a worker is not authorized to
work to challenge a back pay or reinstatement award under Hoffman,
because "IRCA does not require that the Board permit baseless inquiry into
immigration status in every case in which reinstatement or backpay is
granted."' Absent sufficient evidence, the NLRB proscribed the
employer's affirmative defense that the complaining worker was
185. Telephone Interview with NLRB Office of General Counsel staff (Jan. 11, 2012).
186. 357 NLRB No. 47 at *4-9 (Liebman, J., concurring).
187. Flaum Appetizing Corp., 357 NLRB No. 162 (Dec. 30, 2011).
188. Id.
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undocumented and therefore ineligible for backpay.'" In addition, the
Board in Flaum criticized the employer's attempt to uncover disabling
evidence on all its employees through subpoenas demanding employees'
work authorizations and identity documents such as passports, alien
registration cards, driver's licenses, and social security cards under IRCA.
"Permitting such re-verification [of work authorization status] without
sufficient factual basis would invite a form of abuse expressly prohibited by
IRCA, and would contravene ordinary rules of procedure."l90 in so
determining, the Board constructed procedural barriers for employers
wishing to avail themselves of Hoffman, once again limiting the scope of
Hoffman 's reach through regulatory action.
The General Counsel office issued a memo in May 2012 to provide
field offices with guidance on how to respect NLRB procedures in light of
Flaum.19 ' In it, the General Counsel office reiterated that a respondent
employer may not use the compliance phase as a means to fish for evidence
showing that an employee lacks work authorization and is ineligible for
backpay under Hoffman.192 It instructed NLRB regional field offices to
require that a respondent provide, either in the answer or a bill of
particulars, a full accounting of the evidence upon which it intends to rely
to assert that employees are ineligible for backpay, or if such an accounting
is not provided, to file a motion to strike the employer's affirmative
defenses or a motion for summary judgment.'93
Additionally, the memo announced a change in office policy: the Case
Handling Manual no longer requires documentation for employee
reinstatement and, indeed, a reinstatement offer will be considered invalid if
conditioned on re-verification of employment status.' 94 The memo goes
beyond the Flaum order in its level of detail and its expectations of
affirmative action; for example, the memo instructs NLRB counsel to object
to attempts to litigate immigration status at compliance hearings. 95 Further,
it raises the possibility that these fishing expeditions themselves constitute
unfair labor practices in violation of section 8 of the NLRA.' 96
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to All Regional Directors,
Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers, NLRB 1, 1-3 (May 4, 2012), available at
http://www.unioncounsel.net/developments/immigration/news/case-handling-instructions.pdf. While
these types of informal memoranda do not carry the force of law per se, they can be very influential in
the development of the law and the adoption of office practices.
192. Id. at 2.
193. Id. at 2.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at 3.
196. The memo cites legal authority for the proposition that the effect of status-related inquiries
outweighs the probative value of the discovery and could constitute an unfair labor practice and that the
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Such detailed memoranda are neither routine nor uncommon. As a
career attorney at the NLRB explained, "It needs to strike a chord with
somebody here for some reason. It's not uncommon to have a memo if two
criteria are satisfied: the significance of the issue and the intersection of the
subject with the interests of the current personnel."' In this instance,
issuing a memo was equally attractive to the politically appointed Board
members and the regional field offices staffed by career attorneys because it
safeguarded workers and protected the Board's own processes from
abuse.198 The same official acknowledged that the memo's indications that
fishing expeditions might constitute unfair labor practices in violation of the
NLRA is more noteworthy: the issue was not raised by the facts of Flaum,
but was nevertheless included "to clarify the agency's continually
developing post-Hoffman jurisprudence" and to "routinize processes."'"
He continued: "We're trying to effectuate what we want immigration issues
to look like in the Board. Where we see a means to provide guidance to the
Region, we'll try to incorporate it into the developing norms."200 "It is rare
to grab a board decision and to issue guidance to regions directing them to
apply new guidance in a way that pushes the portfolio. The more it happens
the happier I'll be, but it doesn't always happen."201
Summary. The NLRB case study strongly supports an integration of
bureaucratic incorporation theory with the political control thesis as
bureaucratic politics. Under the right political conditions, civil servants
vigorously responded to Hoffman with their use of informal guidance to the
field offices,202 their novel classification of retaliatory deportation as an
unfair labor practice, and their modeling of other agencies' equitable
approaches toward rehabilitating status through deferred action and U-visa
certification. These actions took place primarily in the Operations-
Management Division, which accords with organizational theorists'
emphasis on standard operating procedures. The institutionalization of
"Division of Advice would need to authorize complaint alleging that an Employer's misuse of the
Board's hearing subpoena process" violates the NLRA. Id. at 3.
197. Telephone Interview with official, NLRB Office of General Counsel (June 5, 2012). In the
interview, the official defined "significance" beyond the number of cases raised, as also including the
complexity of the jurisprudence: "It's not an easy area of the law given conflicting intent in IRCA and
other legislation."
198. Id.
199. Id. The NLRB position on the difficult question of when litigants' petitions constitute an ULP
is still developing. The regions are urged to confer with the Advice Division if they obtain a fact pattern
with conduct that could constitute conduct that violates the NLRA. "We're not telling regions to go out
and test novel ideas without seeking advice first." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. The NLRB Orders in Flaum and Mezonos show that agency discretion goes both ways. They
also demonstrate the complicating relationship of law and politics in Board adjudication and GC
memoranda. See Flaum Appetizing Corp., 357 NLRB No. 162 (Dec. 30, 2011); Mezonos Maven
Bakery, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 47 (Aug. 9, 2011).
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these measures allows for continuity across changing political leadership.
The NLRB Office of General Counsel's protection of undocumented
workers despite Hoffman, along with their motivations, illustrates this
Article's theme: in the complex regulatory environment resulting from the
agency's dual commitment to enforcing the NLRA and the work-related
provisions of IRCA, professionalism trumped politics. The following two
case studies illustrate variations in other federal workplace agencies
confronted with a similarly restrictive regulatory arena.
B. The DOL pursues policies of "deconfliction"to buffer potential
conflicts between immigration enforcement and labor enforcement.
Although the broad dynamics of undocumented worker regulation in
the DOL resemble those of the NLRB, there are at least two critical
differences. First, the DOL is an executive agency headed by a cabinet-
level secretary who serves at the pleasure of the President. As such, the
agency is more susceptible to partisan politics than an independent
commission such as the NLRB, which is composed of members of both
parties and whose commissioners can only be fired for cause.203 The case
study demonstrates this susceptibility of the DOL, and yet concludes that
professional ethos nevertheless constrain politics. Thus, the case study
provides a more nuanced view of bureaucratic politics the details how-not
whether-politics matters in regard to enforcement of immigrants' rights.
A second difference is that the Hoffman decision did not directly challenge
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), administered by the DOL. This
provides the DOL with greater leeway to exercise its discretion on behalf of
immigrant workers. The case study begins by describing the DOL's
regulatory arena. It then considers the public statements of DOL's political
leadership in relation to the informal policy guidance and litigation
positions of civil servants in the enforcement divisions of the DOL, in order
to understand the interplay between politics and professionalism in the
DOL's strategy to protect undocumented workers after Hoffman.
The post-Hoffman regulatory arena of the DOL is less legally
complicated than that of the NLRB. Both preceding and following
Hoffman, the DOL in its policy guidances consistently affirmed its statutory
duty to protect vulnerable classes of workers.2 04  The definition of a
vulnerable worker is not statutorily defined under the FLSA, but it has
consistently been interpreted to include immigrants.2 05 In Josendis v. Wall
203. For an administrative law treatise covering differences in institutional design, see RICHARD J.
PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (2008).
204. DOL Fact sheet, supra note 56.
205. The interpretation of immigrants as being covered by the FLSA originated in Sure-Tan, 467
U.S. 883 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 148-153.
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to Wall Residence Repairs,206 for example, an immigrant construction
worker filed for minimum wage, mandatory overtime, and backpay wages
associated with the company's failure to comply with FLSA wage
requirements; Wall to Wall declined to pay, stating that Josendis was
ineligible for FLSA protections and remedies. The DOL's Office of the
Solicitor filed a letter brief on behalf of the United States at the Eleventh
Circuit's request, clarifying Hoffman's impact on the coverage of
undocumented immigrants under the FLSA.207 The DOL letter brief stated
that FLSA minimum wage claims and overtime compensation claims
remained viable because recovering unpaid wages for work already
performed did not present the same perceived conflict with IRCA policies
as did backpay awards for wage losses resulting from unlawful job
deprivation under the NLRA. The DOL letter brief elaborated:
A suit for wages for hours worked under the FLSA seeks payment for work
actually performed, rather than for work employees claim they would have
performed but for their illegal layoff or termination. Accordingly, a suit for
FLSA back wages does not implicate the Supreme Court's concern in
Hoffman that Congress did not intend to permit recovery for work not
performed and for wages that could not lawfully have been earned. It also
does not implicate the Supreme Court's concern that an NLRA back pay
award, which is contingent on an undocumented worker's continued
presence in the United States, could encourage such workers to remain in
the United States in order to obtain a recovery. And there is no duty to
mitigate damages in an FLSA suit for hours worked; thus, there is no
tension with the rule that employees who seek back pay for illegal discharge
must mitigate their damages. 208
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in
favor of the employer on other grounds.209 Judges Tjoflat and Cox, who
constituted the majority, did not expressly discuss the relevance of
employee Josendis' immigration status, merely stating that "the limited
discovery the district court afforded Josendis after the time for discovery
had closed" did not constitute an abuse of discretion.2 10 The lone dissenter,
Judge Korman, reached the status issue in the last paragraph of his decision:
I recognize that the result for which I have argued would require us to reach
the issue whether Josendis, an illegal alien, is entitled to the protection of
the FLSA. I agree with the position expressed in the letter brief submitted
by the Solicitor of the United States Department of Labor, which we
206. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292 (1Ith Cir. 2011).
207. See Letter from Laura Moskowitz, Attn., DOL, Office of the Solicitor, to John Ley, Clerk of
Court, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Aug. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/josendis%28A%29-8-26-2010.pdf.
208. Id. at 3-4.
209. 662 F.3d at 1292, 1298.
210. Id. at 1298, 1307-08.
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requested, that 'undocumented workers are entitled to recover minimum
wages and overtime pay for hours worked under the FLSA' 211 (as] another
panel of the Eleventh Circuit recently held in an unpublished opinion,
Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp ... .
212,213
The concern raised in Hoffman about awarding backpay to immigrant
workers ineligible for reinstatement was not presented in the facts of
Josendis. The DOL maintained its longstanding position, articulated in
Patel v. Quality Inn South,2 14 that the plain meaning and history of the
FLSA 2 15 covered undocumented immigrants, and the court deferred to the
Secretary's longstanding interpretation.2 16
If the legal dimensions of the DOL's regulatory arena remain relatively
straightforward, the political dimensions are potentially complicated by the
agency's structure as an executive agency. Led by a Senate-confirmed,
cabinet-level Secretary who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the
President, the agency is less insulated than the NLRB from the influence of
partisan politics. Still, the continuity of the DOL's legal positions with
policy statements issued under both Republican and Democratic political
leadership suggests that shifting politics alone fails to explain readily the
DOL's status-blind application of labor laws to immigrants.
Immediately after the Hoffman decision, President Bush's Secretary of
Labor, Elaine Chao, held a press briefing with representatives of the
Spanish-language press, in which she emphasized that Hoffman would not
prevent the Department from enforcing immigrant workers' right to be
211. Letter from Laura Moskowitz at 1, supra note 207.
212. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1327 (Korman, J., dissenting) (citing Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp.,
432 F. App'x 801 (11th Cir. June 23, 2011) (per curiam)). Galdames also followed Eleventh Circuit
precedent, Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir. 1988).
213. The Josendis dissent continued: "Nor would a contrary result deter illegal aliens seeking
employment in the United States. Instead, denying them the protection of the FLSA would only
encourage employers to hire illegal aliens, as opposed to citizens, because in so doing employers could
avoid the expense of complying with the FLSA. Such a result is contrary to public policy and, for that
reason alone, we should reject Acosta's suggestion that we decline to follow binding precedent on this
issue." 662 F.3d at 1327 (Korman, J., dissenting).
214. See Patel, 846 F.2d at 703-06 (taking notice of the DOL's position and the legislative record
for both IRCA and FLSA).
215. Richard Blum sets out a convincing legislative history in Richard E. Blum, Labor Standards
Enforcement and the Results of Labor Migration: Protecting Undocumented Workers after Sure-Tan,
the IRCA, and Patel, 63 NYU L. REV. 1342, 1361 (1988). Blum demonstrates that President Carter's
immigration agenda included a legislative effort to eliminate wage and hour abuse against
undocumented workers. Id. While Carter's comprehensive immigration reform bill did not pass,
Congress incorporated 260 provisions into an appropriations bill in the Wage and Hour Division of the
DOL "to strengthen enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act" including targeted investigations
"into industries with high incidence of undocumented workers." Id. at 1361-62 (citations omitted). The
targeted enforcement became known as the Employers of Undocumented Workers Program. Id. at 1362.
It was renamed the Special Targeted Enforcement Program under the Reagan Administration. See 71
United States Dep't Labor Ann. Rep. Fiscal Year 1983 at 45.
216. See Patel, 846 F.2d at 703.
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compensated under the FLSA for work already performed.217 Shortly
thereafter, Secretary Chao issued a Joint Statement with the Mexican
Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare "reaffirm[ing DOL's] commitment
to fully enforce the applicable labor laws administered by our department to
protect workers-all workers, regardless of status."2 18 President Obama's
Labor Secretary Hilda Solis explained, "I have a vested interest in
protecting all workers that work here in the U.S. Period." 2 19 She elaborated,
"[T]he government is quite clear in terms of protecting all workers here in
the U.S. regardless of origins. Under Republican and Democratic
administrations, that's the law." 220  The overt references to consistency
across administrations strongly suggest that the agency's policies emanate
from law, rather than partisan politics alone.
In keeping with these rule-bound stances, high-level attorneys in the
enforcement divisions of the DOL explained the agency's rationale for
status-blind investigations of workplace violations in by referencing official
agency documents and public statements.221 The Wage and Hour
Division's headquarters office, which provides guidance to the field offices
most directly responsible for laws pertaining to immigrant workers' wages,
issued a "Fact Sheet" that simultaneously reaffirmed its pre-Hoffman legal
positions and clarified the scope of the Hoffman decision on the FLSA.222
In the fact sheet, the agency stated that Hoffman does not change the
availability of payment for work already performed. It clarified that the
Hoffman limitations on backpay for work that would have been performed
but for unlawful hiring is limited to administration of the NLRA by the
NLRB, not extending to administration of the FLSA by the DOL.223 While
the fact sheet itself does not carry the force of law as sub-regulatory
217. See Letter from Laura Moskowitz, supra note 207.
218. Transcript, U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Mexican Labor Relations, Foreign Press Center
Briefing (July 12, 2002), available at http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/l 1831.htm. There is some
evidence that Chao's statement with Mexico partly resulted from pressure due to pending litigation
before the Interamerican Court, but this is not confirmed within the DOL.
219. Neil Munro, Labor Secretary: U.S. to Protect Illegal Workers, THE DAILY CALLER,
September 2, 2011, available at http://dailycaller.com/2011/08/31/labor-secretary-u-s-to-protect-illegal-
workers/. Secretary Solis was appointed by President Obama in 2009. She had previously served as a
representative of the 32nd Congressional District in California from 2001-2009. Solis was the first
Latina elected to the California State Senate in 1994.
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Telephone Interview with staff in Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (Jan. 13,
2012).
222. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 56 (released under President Bush's Secretary of Labor Elaine
Chao within months of Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. 137).
223. Id. While the DOL Fact Sheet accurately conveys that Hoffman did not eliminate
compensatory remedies for hours worked in the overtime and minimum wage context, it is less clear that
it has staved off the effects of Hoffman and IRCA in the context of compensation for retaliation. Id.
Also, the circuits are split on whether punitive damages are available. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (West Supp. 2008).
2012 269
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 33:2
guidance, it facilitates interpretations and implementation of the organic
statute (the FLSA) in regulations that do have the binding force of law.224
Rather than discuss her own views of DOL obligations to undocumented
workers, the senior administrator interviewed referenced the agency's
written documentation. 2 5  Other high-level officials interviewed who
preferred not to be identified by their office gave similarly guarded
responses to queries seeking their personal views.
The interviews with DOL officials suggested that the DOL's
protections for undocumented workers are largely explained through its
legal and organizational commitments. At the legal level, multiple
enforcement divisions emphatically distinguished their agency's statutory
mandate-ensuring maximal compliance with wage and hour laws under
the FLSA-from Hoffman 's limitations on backpay remedies for unlawful
firing of undocumented workers. This minimizes the sense of conflict
between the two enforcement regimes and gives the impression of wide
latitude for agency discretion in policy matters. At the organizational level,
the case study shows the ever-present need for federal agencies to allocate
their resources toward industries employing the most vulnerable workers,
who are often undocumented workers. It is not entirely accurate to say that
politics does not matter, even if the organizational and professional pull of
non-partisan law enforcement is strong. 2 6 Partisan politics matters in more
nuanced ways, influencing the availability of resources, 227 the degree of
enforcement, 2 28 the ambitiousness of policy, 229 and the level of community
outreach.230
224. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 203.
225. Telephone Interview with staff, Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (Jan. 13,
2012).
226. My interviews with DOL staff reflected their increased vulnerability. Interviews required
prior clearances and subjects were more guarded in their statements.
227. For precise figures and announcement of hiring of 300 new investigators under the Obama
Administration, see http://www.wageandhourlawupdate.com/tags/wage-and-hour-division/.
228. As evidence, consider the shift in enforcement strategy from the Bush Administration
(emphasizing workplace raid) to the Obama Administration (focus on criminals and vigorous exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, with guidance to ask about employment issue during TIPS investigations and
explicit mention in prosecutorial discretion.) That said, community advocates lauded the Bush
Administration's disavowal of a workplace raid in North Carolina when DHS masqueraded as OSHA
officials and then deported workers. "They got it." Telephone Interview with attorney, National
Employment Law Project (June 11, 2012).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 241-256 (discussion of Memorandum from the Department
of Justice and the Employment Standards Administration, Department of Labor, on Understanding
Between the Immigration and Naturalization Services (Nov. 13, 1998)).
230. A good example is the "We Can Help" campaign under the Obama Administration. This
represents an affirmative effort to publicize government services using celebrity voiceovers who
promote the message that status doesn't matter. See Department of Labor video featuring Dolores
Huerta, available at http://youtu.be/d5ouQCkFZYI; Department of Labor video featuring Hilda Solis,
available at http://youtu.belldlWgY7Hms.
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Within a legally and organizationally constrained view of politics, the
DOL's regulatory activities involve noteworthy exercises of discretion.
Workplace agencies-like all agencies-exercise the most basic discretion
through allocation of their limited resources to achieve maximum effect.231'
At least anecdotally, the changing administration ushered in more
departmental resources for labor enforcement.2 32 These increased resources
bolstered the DOL's capacity to engage in more aggressive enforcement
generally. A long-time administrator in the Wage and Hour Division
maintained that the DOL priorities are developed through self-initiated
enforcement work, rather than through the complaints of individual
workers.233 Choices about where to focus enforcement efforts are driven by
organizational concerns such as achieving maximum impact with minimal
funds.234 Typically, "decisions about resource allocation are geared toward
industries where the most vulnerable workers are employed and those
industries undergoing dynamic change. Many of those industries include
low-wage, low-skilled, and immigrant workers."235 Speaking within the
broad context of industry changes, the administrator observed that the
changes were not merely, or even mostly, about politics. "We've seen over
the years industries changing how they do business ... it's not just a
business owner and his employees anymore. They contract out their labor,
they use staffing companies, and they use more franchising. Those
practices attenuate the traditional relationship between employers and
employees and create openings for abuse."236 An independent report from
the Migration Policy Institute confirms that industry changes often lead to
higher violation rates.237 In addition, a "bump up" of enforcement often
occurs during a recession-as people lose jobs, the fear of retaliation no
longer discourages them from filing claims.238
While this does not disprove that politics matter-indeed, politics
makes available increased funding levels-it underscores that pro-
immigrant politics were not the motivating force and cannot singularly
account for pro-immigrant actions. The Wage and Hour Division's
explanations attribute stronger immigrant worker protections to effective
231. Consistent with Alison's model II and the sociologists' case studies. See Allison, supra note
65; sources cited supra note 137.
232. For descriptions of Labor Secretary Hilda Solis' initiatives since taking office, see Hilda L.
Solis, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hilda-l-solis/gIQA59lg9Otopic.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2012); Dep't of Labor, http://www.dol.gov (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).





237. DONALD M. KERWIN & KRISTEN MCCABE, LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT AND Low-
WAGE IMMIGRANTS, (Migration Policy Inst. 2011).
238. Telephone Interview, supra note 233.
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labor enforcement that protects all workers, and not to a concern for
immigrant workers per se or to reverence for the political leadership's
changing priorities. Thus, from an organizational standpoint, protecting
immigrants is a matter of agency stewardship. 239
Another area where agency discretion matters is policy development.
Attorneys in the current DOL headquarters divisions asserted that they
follow an approach toward labor enforcement that harmonizes the purposes
of the FLSA and IRCA.240 Yet history shows that the DOL attorneys have
experienced friction between labor remedies and immigration remedies. In
the years preceding Hoffman, the DOL drafted a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with DHS's predecessor, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, in 1998 that attempted to address some of the
tensions inherently raised by IRCA.24 ' The 1998 MOU stipulated that DOL
investigators would no longer inspect employees' immigration-related
documents in any investigation of a complaint alleging labor standards
violations, because knowledge of a worker's undocumented status could
chill individual complaints from workers fearing that a complaint could
result in apprehension and deportation.24 2 The 1998 MOU also stated that
DOL investigators would no longer issue warning notices to employers
found to be in violation of documentation obligations under IRCA, which
blurred enforcement functions.243 These stances contradict the perceived
239. Gleeson, Status-Blind Approach, supra note 113.
240. Telephone Interview, supra note 233.
241. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Naturalization Services,
Department of Justice and the Employment Standards Administration, Department of Labor, 75 No. 47
Interpreter Releases 1711-1721 (Nov. 23, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 MOU]. The 1998 MOU replaced a
1992 MOU that required DOL investigators to examine workers' documentation and expeditiously
communicate irregularities to INS in the course of their own labor standards investigations. Id. As
Miriam Wells explains, although the memo specified that DOL would "take no action which will
compromise its ability to carry out its fundamental mission regardless of workers' immigration status,"
in practice the agreement turned DOL field investigators into INS enforcement agents. Miriam J. Wells,
The Grassroots Reconfiguration of U.S. Immigration Policy, 38 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 1308, 1332
(2004). While its influence on the rescission of the 1992 MOU is contested, concerns that the 1992
MOU dampened the enforcement of wage and overtime protections were documented by the Yale Law
School Workers' Rights Project and the ACLU Immigrant Rights Project and filed in a petition before
the tribunal for the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and later reviewed by Maria
Echaveste, a former DOL wage and hour labor administrator who was promoted to Deputy Chief of
Staff to President Clinton. Id.
242. See 1998 MOU, supra note 240.
243. This approach mirrors what was found in the most in-depth studies of inter-agency conflict
between the DOL and the INS (the predecessor agency to the DHS). CALAVITA, supra note 141. In that
study, Kitty Calavita describes elaborate efforts to "dodge" the contradictions confronting each agency
as a resolution to "wrangling" inherent in the overlapping jurisdiction of the two agencies and the
tensions between employment and immigration enforcement. Id. Calavita spent two years analyzing
internal documents in the INS and DOL surrounding the Bracero Program. She concludes in a chapter
on "wrangling" between the DOL and INS, "the steady stream of central office memos and reports from
the field left little doubt that the INS placed priority on ensuring a generous supply of low-wage
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inter-agency harmony described by the DOL staff that I interviewed; the
DOL staff who I interviewed seem to sincerely perceive no conflict, but
theirs is not the only interpretation available.244
Another example of DOL officials implementing Hoffman's
requirements in ways sensitive to the needs of undocumented workers can
be found in the DOL's memos expressing concern about employer
retaliation against immigrant workers who seek to enforce their labor rights,
often leading to DHS investigations following workers' legitimate
complaints about workplace conditions. In December 2011, the DOL
strengthened the 1998 MOU in a "Revised Memorandum of Understanding
between the DHS and DOL Concerning Enforcement Activities at
Worksites."245 The stated purpose of the 2011 MOU is "to ensure that
respective civil worksite enforcement activities do not conflict." 24 6 It reads
in part: "The parties. . . recognize that the enforcement process of both labor
and immigration related worksite laws requires that the enforcement
process be insulated from manipulation by other parties."24 7
Although similar in spirit to the 1998 MOU, the 2011 MOU is more
explicit about its strategy of "deconfliction" between agency enforcement
activities.248 For example, there is a general presumption in the MOU
against ICE entering worksites to investigate immigration status once a
DOL investigation into abuses of wage and hour laws has begun.249 This
lessens the possibility that an aggrieved employer will call ICE officials to
punish workers who reported them to DOL. It also lessens the possibility
that a DOL investigation will be thwarted by clashing directives from ICE.
For example, ICE might detail or deport key witnesses to DOL
investigations prior to their testimony. This revised MOU ensures that
abusive employers are not able to manipulate the investigation process to
their own advantage. In instances when ICE engages in worksite
braceros, that this supply was considered integral to resolving their 'enforcement problem,' and that the
DOL was perceived as their antagonist in this endeavor." Id. at 130.
244. See Telephone Interviews with attorney, National Employment Law Project (June 11, 2012).
245. Revised Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
and the U.S. Department of Labor Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites (Dec. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter 2011 MOU], available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf. See
also Press Release: US Labor Department to Exercise Authority to Certify Applications for U Visas
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/OPA20100312.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2012).
246. 2011 MOU, supra note 245.
247. Id.
248. Lee contends that "anecdotal evidence suggests that ICE has alerted the DOL only after a
workplace has already been investigated" and that the wording is "ambiguous." Lee, supra note 4 at
1121. He does not discuss the 2011 revision in depth (likely because the development is too recent) and
expresses skepticism about the usefulness of U-visa certifications given that they only provide benefits
at the "ex post" stage. Id. at 1126, 1129.
249. See 2011 MOU, supra note 245.
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enforcement notwithstanding the general presumption against doing so, 2 50
ICE agrees to provide DOL notice of their activities so that DOL can take
appropriate measures to ensure the integrity of its enforcement efforts. 2 51
Distinct from guarding against unlawful retaliation against
undocumented workers or the unjust enrichment of employers who violate
the labor rights of undocumented workers without being required to issue
backpay after Hoffman, DOL staff explained the rationale for the revised
MOU in terms of the needs of labor enforcement.252 According to DOL
staff, ICE agreed to consider deferred action or temporary law enforcement
parole for undocumented immigrant workers, to keep them available to the
DOL for investigation of labor law violations.2 53 This type of discretionary
boundary-keeping between the DOL and ICE enhances agency
effectiveness and promotes the rule of law. When key witnesses in labor
enforcement actions are threatened with deportation or are deported before
providing critical testimony about working conditions or other employer
abuses, labor investigations are effectively shut down. A DOL
administrator explained that the 2011 MOU improves the agency's ability
to do their job:
"[In DOL enforcement activities], many times there are no paper records of
alleged abuses. So DOL relies on interview statements to reconstruct what
happened. If the employee is fearful of talking to us-or otherwise taken
out of the investigation process by virtue of their status-we do not get
information that will help." 254
A corresponding operating instruction from ICE instructs its
enforcement staff to exercise favorable discretion for workers engaged in
protected activity, including union organizing and filing complaints about
employment discrimination or workplace conditions. 255  Notably, during
250. Exceptions include situations where "the Director or Deputy Director of ICE determines that
the enforcement activity is independently necessary to advance an investigation" relating to national
security concerns, or the enforcement activity is directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Labor, the Solicitor of Labor, or another DOL designee. Id. In those cases, ICE agrees to
provide DOL notice and to "make available for interview to DOL any person ICE detains for removal
through a worksite enforcement activity." Id.
251. Id.
252. Telephone Interview with DOL Administrator, Wage and Hour Division (Jan. 13, 2012).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. INS Revises Special Procedures on Enforcement Actions During Labor Disputes, 74 No. 4
INTERPRETER RELEASES 188 (Jan. 27, 1997). Special Agent Field Manual 33.14(h) was formerly
designated INS Operations Instruction 287.3a. INS Field Manual Project to Eventually Replace
Operations Instructions, 77 No. 3 INTERPRETER RELEASES 33 (Jan. 14, 2000). Since renamed Special
Agent Field Manual, 33.14(h)) advises, but does not require, the immigration officer to consult with the
NLRB and DOL as to whether the employer under investigation has a history of labor violations. Id.
Some critics are dubious about the value of the instruction since the immigration agency retains the
ultimate authority to enforce immigration laws even if doing so would undermine labor protection, but
the spirit of the instruction is to regulate the information that ICE can rely upon in order to minimize
opportunities for thwarting labor enforcement. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: Colloquium:
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their interviews about the 2011 MOU, DOL staff did not discuss their own
feelings about DHS immigrant enforcement activities, unlawful retaliation,
or the fairness of allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the
country.2 56 They merely spoke about the implications of the 2011 MOU for
labor enforcement.
DOL staff consistently stated that while their actions may benefit
immigrants, they are not deliberately advocating for favorable outcomes.257
Independent of their personal feelings about immigration, the DOL is
concerned primarily with labor compliance and acts on behalf of the United
States, rather than immigrant workers per se. Still, workers' rights
advocates familiar with the DOL policies conceded that "much depends on
the personal ethos of the political leader, which is shaped by their
experience. In the past, workers' advocacy groups did not consider the
DOL as a partner in securing the rights of undocumented workers.259 Now,
however, these advocacy groups are developing detailed blueprints for
working with the agency.260 They note that many of the people comprising
DOL leadership have experience working with immigrants. For example,
in the Obama administration, DOL solicitor Tricia Smith previously served
as the Attorney General in New York, and Secretary Hilda Solis was
previously an attorney who represented labor unions and immigrant
workers. One legal advocate commented that politics mattered to the
agency positions in the aggressiveness of enforcement: "Secretary Chao
(under President Bush) said that DOL mission would not be affected by
Hoffman, but there was no new U-visa protocol or MOU (as under
President Obama)."
Despite the advocacy backgrounds of some of the DOL's political
leadership and career staff, attorneys and advocates alike differentiate
agency work that is driven by their organizational commitments from
advocacy work of a more overt, political nature. While appreciative of
DOL efforts, some advocates expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects
of the DOL-DHS agreement. 261 In interviews, advocates said that they
The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 389,
390 (2004); Rebecca Smith, Ana Avendafio & Julie Martinez Ortega, Iced Out: How Immigration
Enforcement Has Interfered with Workers' Rights 14 (2009), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/laborunions/29/.
256. Telephone Interview with NLRB staff in Office of General Counsel (Jan. 12, 2012);
Telephone Interview with DOL Administrator, Wage and Hour Division (Jan. 13, 2012).
257. Telephone Interview with NLRB staff in Office of General Counsel (Jan. 11, 2012);
Telephone Interview with DOL Administrator, Wage and Hour Division (Jan. 13, 2012).
258. Telephone Interview with Co-Director, ASISTA Immigration Assistance (June 5, 2012).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Notably, prominent advocacy organizations and unions have not released any statements
praising the 2011 MOU. This may be partly strategic given a political environment dubious about
government generally and specifically critical of Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, who comes from an
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sought more ambitious revisions to the MOU and felt the resulting MOU
was comparatively modest. 26 2 One characterized the 2011 MOU as a "four
corners" document with which the DOL and DHS are unlikely to comply if,
for example, employers retaliated against workers' families rather than the
workers themselves. 26 3 Another advocate expressed skepticism about the
commitment to training line attorneys in MOU implementation. 26 ' During a
conference call among advocates, he recounted speaking with the director
of a Wage and Hour regional office who said that the 2011 MOU was
"above his pay grade" and that he knew nothing about it.2 65  The DOL
protocols recount that "guidance and initial training. . . has already been
provided to certain key Wage and Hour Division and Regional Solicitor of
Labor staff' and that "further training is planned for the future."266 it
remains too soon to tell how vigorously the 2011 MOU will ultimately be
used given its relatively recent enactment, but the immigrants' rights
advocates' ambivalence speaks to their perceptions of the agency's mixed
motives.
In comparison to the 2011 MOU, the DOL's protocols for certification
of U-visas bespeak a more aggressive approach toward implementation.
Although the DOL was the last of the three federal workplace agencies to
announce that it would exercise its authority to certify U-visa petitions, it
has taken the most comprehensive approach toward enforcement. In
addition to appointing a national coordinator in headquarters,267 it hired five
regional specialists268 to serve the field offices in its certification of U-visas.
But perhaps as striking as the DOL's commitment of resources and pursuit
of structural change that strengthens the possibility for surviving change in
advocacy background. Some advocates maintained that they recognize the DOL's revision is a step
forward, but that they are honoring the DOL's wish to remain quiet about it. Telephone Interview with
staff attorney, NELP (June 12, 2012). The difficulty that I had obtaining interviews with the DOL on the
subject of the MOU suggests this advocate's perception is accurate.
262. Telephone Interview with immigrants' rights advocate (Jan. 23, 2010); Telephone Interview
with immigrants' rights advocates (Feb. 6, 2012); Telephone Interview with immigrants' rights advocate
(Feb. 22, 2012).
263. Telephone Interview with immigrants' rights advocate (Jan. 23, 2012).
264. Id.
265. Telephone Interview with staff attorney, NELP (June 12, 2012).
266. Department of Labor U Visa Process and Protocols, Question - Answer (Apr. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/whd20l10619-qa.pdf. The same protocol explains
that final authority for certification has been delegated to the Wage and Hour Division's Regional
Administrators, who are located in five cities nationwide. Id. These senior officials will be assisted by
regional coordinators with specialized training to ensure that certification is handled "efficiently and
effectively." Id. This type of centralized decision-making is not uncommon for new or sensitive
protocols among agencies.
267. According to the job listing, this is a career position in the DOL Wage and Hour Division. It
is currently filled by Jennifer Marion, who serves as a "senior advisor." See Wage and Hour Key
Program Personnel, DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/whdkeyp.htm.
268. The list of U-visa specialists is on file with the author.
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political administration is that nobody at the DOL told me about the
recruitment of U-visa coordinators for fear of political reprisal.269 (I instead
learned about the recruitment plans from advocates.)
Summary. The DOL's regulatory arena is complicated for reasons of
governance rather than reasons of law per se. The DOL claims that the
FLSA does not conflict with IRCA as a legal matter and that Hoffman's
ruling does not bar its workplace enforcement mission in the way it might
for the NLRB.270 To the extent that DOL's commitments stand in tension
with DHS's implementation of IRCA after Hoffman, however, the DOL
uses an interagency MOU with DHS to buffer potential clashes. 27' The
MOU promotes policies of de-confliction with ICE to maintain a respectful
distance-in essence, "to leave one another alone" -within their
overlapping regulation of immigrant workers.2 72 In addition, the DOL's
recent adoption of an ambitious implementation plan for U-visa
certification indicates that changed political conditions influence the scope
and vigor of the agency's execution of its mission in both subtle and overt
ways.273 Politics matters more in an executive agency than in an
independent agency, but organizational and professional values nevertheless
constrain the executive agency as bureaucratic politics.
C. The EEOC uses its mission of eradicating employment
discrimination for protected classes of workers to mitigate
workplace abuse against immigrants.
If the DOL and NLRB distinguished their legal obligations to
undocumented workers after Hoffman to defend their protective stances,
this third and final case study shows that the EEOC went a step further: it
asserted its statutory obligations to mitigate workplace abuses damaging to
immigrant workers. More specifically, the EEOC called upon its obligation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to eliminate discrimination on the
basis of membership in several protected categories.274 Why is the EEOC
willing and able to protect immigrant workers so vigorously? The pattern of
bureaucratic politics developing through these case studies entails a
269. This approach contrasts starkly with their own approach toward the MOU and the NLRB's
more ad hoc approach to U-visa certification that relies on General Counsel guidance impacting standard
operating procedure in the field. It also contrasts with EEOC approach of centralizing certification
authority with the five politically appointed Commissioners after many years taking a more localized
approach.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 211-223.
271. As explained in the interviews with NLRB Office of General Counsel, Hoffman does not
address ICE activities thereby leaving open the possibility for this kind of policy entrepreneurship.
Telephone Interview with NLRB staff in Office of General Counsel (Jan. 11, 2012).
272. See 2011 MOU, supra notes 245-252 and accompanying text.
273. Id.; Lee supra note 4, at 1126.
274. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
2012 277
BERKELEYJOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 33:2
complex regulatory arena, strong professional ethos, and a limited role for
politics. The EEOC case study introduces some important variations that
make possible unexpectedly strong immigrant worker protections. First, in
terms of its regulatory arena, the EEOC's enforcement of Title VII, an
antidiscrimination statute, does not squarely conflict with Hoffman 's ruling
on backpay as did the NLRB's prior stances. In addition, the impact of
partisan politics and interagency clashes on EEOC decision-makers is
weaker than in an executive agency such as the DOL.
This case study begins by describing the EEOC's commitment to
immigrant workers in the context of its statutory charge to enforce Title
VII. It then examines the roles of professionalism and politics in
maintaining pro-immigrant stances across presidential administrations and
in the years following Hoffman. The case study concludes with an
accounting of the agency's protection of female farmworkers to illustrate its
creative use of gender-based claims to reach allegations of sexual assault
against immigrant workers.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act created EEOC and specifies that its
core mission is to eradicate employment discrimination on the basis of
several protected categories, including race, sex, and national origin.2 75
Title VII does not directly provide for protection of immigrants on the basis
of citizenship status,2 76 but such protection may arise in the course of
investigating allegations of national origin discrimination, when a
citizenship requirement is a "pretext" for national origin discrimination or
part of a wider scheme of discrimination.2 77 Within its statutory mandate,
individual EEOC Commissioners have championed their commitment to
immigrant workers. President Clinton's EEOC Chairwoman Ida Castro278
wrote, "[U]nauthorized workers are especially vulnerable to abuse and
exploitation," making it "imperative for employers to fully understand that
discrimination against this class of employees will not be tolerated and that
275. Id.
276. The Supreme Court case establishing this principle, the only one to opine on the meaning of
national origin discrimination, is Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) ("Aliens are
protected from illegal discrimination under the [Civil Rights] Act, but nothing in the [Civil Rights] Act
makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."). The EEOC Compliance
Manual for National Origin Discrimination describes Citizenship-Related Issues in Part 13-VI.
Enforcement Guidance: National Origin Discrimination, 13 EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-VI (Dec. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html#VI (Citizenship-Related Issues).
277. Enforcement Guidance: National Origin Discrimination, 13 EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-11
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html#II (What is "National Origin"
Discrimination?).
278. Ida Castro served as EEOC Chairwoman from 1998 to 2001. She was appointed by President
Clinton as the first Latina Chairwoman of the EEOC in 1998 and unanimously confirmed by the U.S.
Senate the same year. She previously worked at the U.S. Department of Labor and as a labor and
employment lawyer. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ida L.
Castro Resigns from Commission (Aug. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-13-01.cfm
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they will be responsible for appropriate remedies (under Title VII, ADEA,
ADA, and the Equal Pay Act) if they violate the civil rights laws."279 Under
Castro's leadership, in 1999 the Office of Legal Counsel issued guidance
permitting broad remedies for unlawful discrimination against
undocumented workers, in keeping with this status-blind approach.280
The pre-Hoffman EEOC positions supporting backpay for immigrant
workers are reflected in Egbuna v. Time Life Libraries.28 ' In Egbuna, the
EEOC opposed a district court finding that a Nigerian worker who had
overstayed his visa could not demonstrate that he was a victim of
discrimination after he was refused re-employment because of a sexual
harassment complaint he made previously.282 The district court had
reasoned that, at the time he sought re-employment, Egbuna was
unqualified for the job because he did not possess legal documentation
authorizing him to work.283 Chair Cari Dominguez, a President Bush
appointee, made similarly pro-immigrant statements in 2002: "Protecting
immigrant workers from illegal discrimination has been, and will continue
to be, a priority for the EEOC."2 84
Although the Commissioners never retracted their commitment to
immigrant workers in the 1997 guidance and 1998 Egbuna litigation,
Hoffman complicated the EEOC's regulatory terrain' in 2002. After
carefully reviewing the Supreme Court's Hoffman decision, on June 28,
2002 (three months after the Hoffman decision), the EEOC rescinded its
1999 Guidance on "Remedies Available to Undocumented Workers Under
279. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Issues Guidance on
Remedies for Undocumented Workers Under Laws Prohibiting Employment Discrimination (Oct. 26,
1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/archive/10-26-99.html. This stance
continues the position of former EEOC Commissioner Paul Igasaki, who was appointed by Clinton.
280. Id.
281. See Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 95 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1996).
282. Id; see also Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 6, Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 95
F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2547), 1991 WL 17056115.
283. 95 F.3d at 353. Egbuna was subsequently overturned by the Fourth Circuit en banc, but the
EEOC maintained that workers were entitled to remedy and persuaded the Fourth Circuit panel in the
first instance. See id.; Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Notably, this line of decisions is somewhat separate from the Hoffman chain of events. The EEOC also
engaged in non-precedential actions premised on assumptions of immigrant worker protection, such as
filing for protective orders when necessary to avoid retaliation against complainants.
284. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Reaffirms
Commitment to Protecting Undocumented Workers from Discrimination (Jun. 28, 2002), available at
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-28-02.cfm. Cari Dominguez was sworn in as EEOC Chair in
2001, under President George W. Bush. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Cari M. Dominguez Takes Oath as EEOC Chair, available at http://eeoc.gov/press/8-6-
01.html. She had previously served in the U.S. Department of Labor and numerous employment-related
private law firms. Id.
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Federal Employment Laws." 285 Although not at liberty to discuss internal
deliberations in specific terms, a staff member in the Office of Legal
Counsel explained that the rescission was the product of an awareness of a
tough political, legal, and economic climate. 286 Arguably, the rescission
was legally compelled insofar as the EEOC's guidance relied on precedent
directly overturned by the Supreme Court; Hoffman posed obstacles to
awarding back pay remedies comparable to EEOC awards under Title
VII. 287 But while the Supreme Court exhibited an awareness during oral
argument that Hoffman would implicate Title VII, neither the majority nor
the dissenting opinions offered the agency guidance to establish a new
policy. 288
Facing a vacuum of legal authority, the EEOC did not-and as of
December 2012 still has not-substituted new guidance on remedies for
undocumented workers.289 It instead has reaffirmed its commitment to
vigorously pursue charges brought by undocumented workers and to seek
relief to the extent consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling. 290 EEOC
staff contended that "enforcing the law to protect vulnerable workers,
particularly low income and immigrant workers, remains a priority for
EEOC" for both organizational and pragmatic reasons.291
That the EEOC's stance on immigrant workers has not changed pre- or
post-Hoffman, nor across presidential administrations, is not entirely
surprising. As an independent agency, politics matters less overtly than it
would in an executive agency under a cabinet-level secretary's
leadership.29 2 The five EEOC Commissioners are politically appointed, but
must be bipartisan, with a maximum of three members from the President's
285. The 1999 Enforcement Guidance relied on NLRA cases to conclude that undocumented
workers are entitled to all forms of monetary relief - including back pay - under federal employment
discrimination statutes.
286. Telephone Interview with EEOC Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 20, 2011).
287. Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 509 (2004) (describing the role of backpay in Title VII enforcement).
288. The oral argument transcript includes a lengthy colloquy between the Justices and Hoffman's
attorney about how a prohibition on back pay under the NLRA might affect Title VII cases. Oral
Argument Tr. at *18-20, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-
15952002), 2001 WL 77224 (2002).
289. EEOC Rescission, supra, note 56. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice No.
915.002, Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented Workers Under Federal
Employment Discrimination Laws (1999) (rescinded June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html (under the former guidance, an undocumented worker was
presumptively entitled to back pay if the worker remained present and available for work).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. For an administrative law treatise covering differences in institutional design, see PIERCE ET
AL., supra note 203.
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party.2 93  In addition, Congress substantively and procedurally
circumscribes Commissioners' ability to make policy by statute, resulting in
heavy use of guidance that does not itself carry the force of law. 2 94 As one
Regional Attorney who joined the EEOC under the Clinton Administration
told me, "I've enjoyed strong leadership under the direction of both parties
and consistent support for my [pro-immigrant] work." 295 Another attorney
commented that "the bipartisan structure is effective: Everyone has some
kind of commitment to civil rights, even if you sometimes wish they would
do more."296
Politics does play a role in the sense of the "small P," as one long-time
Regional Attorney put it, referring to non-partisan politics. This attorney
commented that "the Commissioners are influenced by the experiences and
perspectives they bring to the job, most notably whether they've been in the
field. People in the field have experience working with new populations
[Latinos, immigrants] and new types of claims [harassment and assault], not
just backpay. The world has changed."297 Apart from the Commissioners
themselves, the top leadership also consists of the Office of General
Counsel and the Office of Legal Counsel. The attorneys in the Office of
General Counsel, who supervise the regional offices, are widely described
as "lawyers' lawyers," because their reliance on legal precedent in litigation
of cases and filing of amicus briefs in federal courts pronounces their
fidelity to the law. 2 98 The cases on their docket are complaint-driven,
thereby limiting opportunities for affirmative decision-making or agenda-
setting. 299 The Commissioners influence the priorities of the career staff in
the Office of Legal Counsel, who are responsible for formulating guidance
for the resolution of individual charges in the field offices.300 As an Office
of Legal Counsel staff person explained, "[T]here is both a legal component
laid out our enforcement standards and there is a political component that




295. Telephone Interview with Regional Director (in San Francisco field office), EEOC (June 11,
2012).
296. Telephone Interview with Regional Attorney (in Chicago field office), EEOC (May 29,
2012).
297. Id.
298. Telephone Interview with Regional Director (in San Francisco field office), EEOC (June 11,
2012).
299. For general background on the EEOC operations, see agency descriptions at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/commission.cfm.
300. Id.
301. Telephone Interview with EEOC Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 20, 2012).
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Politics and policy preferences further constrain the EEOC's work
because much of the work is complaint-driven. Complaint-driven work
"strikes a different balance between sitting around and deciding to get
involved" than the work of agencies with the ability to decide proactively
how to direct their resources.302 Consequently, the agency does not usually
initiate its own investigations and instead relies on workers to initiate
complaints. In order to encourage aggrieved employees to file complaints
without fear of exposing their legal status to the federal government, the
EEOC adopted a status-blind approach to investigations, an approach
comparable to that of the DOL and the NLRB. The EEOC does not inquire
into a worker's immigration status "on its own initiative," nor does it
consider "an individual's immigration status when examining the
underlying merits of a charge."303 The Office of General Counsel attorney
characterized the EEOC's cultivation of trusting relationships with workers
as instrumental to achieving compliance; the effort put into maintaining
those relationships is the product of the "mutual dependence" of the EEOC
on workers coming forward to prosecute discrimination in a docket that is
overwhelmingly complaint-driven and the workers drawing on the
resources of the EEOC to prove their claims.3 0 4
As a corollary, the EEOC attorney explained that community
engagement among immigrant workers is critical to Title VII enforcement
during the charging phase.30 This is one of the areas in which the EEOC
most distinguishes itself from the other workplace agencies. During years
where Commissioners have been particularly supportive of immigrant
workers, the agency engaged in considerable community outreach. The
EEOC meeting minutes in the years since Hoffman reveal meetings of the
Commissioners with a variety of advocacy organizations - including the
Southern Poverty Law Center's Immigrant Justice Project and several other
immigrant-focused worker groups-to discuss the need for employment
302. Id.
303. Id. This point has been made in several cases citing Hoffman in an antidiscrimination
context; see, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1066-70 (9th Cir. 2004); Escobar v. Spartan, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003); De la Rosa v. North Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238 (C.D.
Ill. 2002). The NIBCO litigation makes a particularly strong case for how status can be avoided in the
context of Title Vll even after IRCA. NIBCO established that Hoffman does not permit an employer's
defense attorneys to ask about immigration status during discovery as a means of coercing withdrawals
of claims or intimidating plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit, drawing heavily on briefs from the Employment
Law Center seeking a protective order to quash inquiries into their immigration status during discovery,
said that the significant differences between the NLRA and Title VII merit different interpretations of
Hoffman. NIBCO, 364 F.3d at 1067-70. Unfortunately, this is not the case in all circuits.
304. Once a cause of action is established, career staff investigates these charges to see if there is
clear evidence of discrimination constituting "good cause" to proceed. Only the charges that have been
determined as presenting cause upon investigation and then get to a point where the employer won't
settle become part of the pool from which the EEOC selects its litigation enforcement.
305. Telephone Interview with EEOC Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 20, 2012).
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discrimination law protections for immigrant workers.306 Some employment
attorneys unfamiliar with immigration law revealed that EEOC attorneys
took a leadership role in teaching the community advocates about
immigration law and advising them on their lobbying efforts on behalf of
immigrant workers. 307  Immigrants' advocates noted the receptivity and
cooperation of the agency to learning about community-based efforts to
protect the immigrant workers within their constituencies.30 s One Regional
Attorney relayed that his best hire was a young attorney from a farmworker
family with relatively little litigation experience but an abundance of
credibility with the immigrant community. 309 The young attorney's ability
to be trusted within the farmworker community proved more critical to
persuading a fearful farmworker to file her charges of sexual assault in the
workplace than years of courtroom experience.3"o
The characterization of a charge as being on the basis of multiple
protected grounds invites further opportunities for interpretation and agency
discretion and policy development. For example, the EEOC can frame a
female immigrant workers' complaint of sexual assault in the workplace as
a complaint on the basis of race, national origin, gender, or a combination
of grounds. The framing of the complaint can impact the viability of the
claim. Since Title VII does not prohibit citizenship discrimination per se,3'
a more straightforward charge can be made on the basis of the better-
defined categories of race or gender, which have more established case law
306. See, e.g., Statement of William R. Tamayo, EEOC Regional Attorney, San Francisco District
Office, to Launch e-Race Initiative (Feb. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/archive/2-28-07/tamayo.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2012) ("The
challenge for the EEOC is to ensure that all workers are protected. In California, for example, Latinos
are 35% of the state population, and Asians are 12%, thereby constituting nearly 50% of the population.
They are over represented in the service industry and low wage jobs and are very vulnerable, but our
charges have yet to reflect those demographics and there is much work to be done."); Written Testimony
of Ana Isabel Vallejo, Supervising Attorney, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center (Jan. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/1-19-ll/vallejo.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2012);
Written Testimony of Daniel Werner, Deputy Director, Immigrant Justice Project, Southern Poverty
Law Center (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/1-19-l l/werner.cfm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2012); Written Testimony of Joshua Stehlik, National Immigration Law Center (July
18, 2012), available at http://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-18-12/stehlik.cfn (last visited Nov. 21,
2012).
307. Telephone Interview with staff attorney, National Immigrant Women's Advocacy Project and
Legal Momentum (June 4, 2012).
308. Telephone Interview with staff attorney, National Employment Law Project (June 11, 2012)
(on U-visa implementation); Telephone Interview with Co-Director, Asista Immigration Assistance
(June 5, 2012) (on drafting VAWA language); Telephone Interview with staff attorney, National
Immigrant Women's Advocacy Project and Legal Momentum (June 4, 2012).
309. Telephone Interview with Regional Attorney (in San Francisco field office) (June 11, 2012).
310. Id.
311. See Enforcement Guidance: National Origin Discrimination, 13 EEOC Compl. Man. § 13-VI,
supra note 277. Discrimination on the basis of a citizenship requirement for a job can be distinguished
from an employer hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal immigration law and then
discriminating against them relative to other workers. Id.
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given the long history and well-documented history of workplace
discrimination leading up to enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.3 12
Claims brought by female immigrant workers might be brought on the basis
of gender in combination with race or national origin, rather than on the
basis of citizenship alone.'
The EEOC investigation into sexual abuse on an egg-farm in Iowa
demonstrates an instance when the EEOC creatively used its powers of
implementation to maximize protections for immigrant workers within the
bounds of its statutory mandate.3 14  The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a
growth in the number of farmworkers in the United States, and a
simultaneous growth of in the number of female and immigrant workers
subjected to sexual abuse on the job.3 " The EEOC attorneys involved in
the Decoster Farms case claimed that they recognized the need to stay
relevant to farmworkers by considering their needs-which differed from
traditional cases seeking backpay remedies.316 The agency sought ways to
serve immigrants, who tended not to report crimes, and sexual harassment
provided an avenue to connect the Violence Against Women Act's
(VAWA) protections with workers.3 " EEOC attorney Jean Kamp
explained that employers subjected their employees to sexual violence
precisely because the undocumented immigrant worker was unlikely to
complain, for fear of being reported to the federal government. 18
In Decoster Farms, female undocumented workers alleged that their
employer engaged in sexual harassment, including rape, sexual abuse, and
retaliation for complaining of work conditions, in violation of Title VII. 9
As EEOC Regional Attorney Bill Tamayo recounted: "Late one night in
2000, I received a disturbing call from the Iowa Coalition Against Domestic
Violence telling me that several Mexican women had been trafficked into
the United States to work in the poultry plants of Decoster Farms False The
EEOC promptly sent a team of investigators to Iowa. But the victims were
scared to cooperate with the federal investigation since they had also been
312. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1989).
313. Telephone Interview with Regional Attorney (in San Francisco field office), EEOC (June I1,
2012); Telephone Interview with Regional Attorney (in Chicago office), EEOC (May 29, 2012).
314. EEOC v. Quality Egg, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:1 1-cv-03071-MWB; EEOC v. Iowa AG, LLC
dba DeCoster Farms, No. 01-CV-3077 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Complaint at 3, EEOC v. DeCoster Farms of
Iowa, Civil Action C02-3077 MWB(N.D. Iowa Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter DeCoster Farms].
315. See PHILIP MARTIN, HARVEST OF CONFUSION: MIGRANT WORKERS IN US AGRICULTURE
(1988).
316. Telephone Interview with Regional Attorney (in Chicago office), EEOC (May 29, 2012).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See cases cited supra note 314.
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threatened with physical harm, including more rapes, if they cooperated." 320
The EEOC filed papers for a preliminary injunction to stop the retaliation
so that they could investigate. 32 1 Given that the allegations involved sexual
harassment and sexual assault, the EEOC characterized its charges as
discrimination on the basis of sex. The EEOC sought monetary damages
under Title VII to compensate victims for their lost jobs; medical expenses;
pain and suffering; equitable relief including, but not limited to, a
permanent injunction; and "further relief as the Court deems necessary and
proper in the public interest."322 After months of investigation and
negotiations, the parties entered a consent decree and the case settled.3 23
Although portions of the agreement are sealed, in its general provisions the
consent decree listed prohibitions against sexual harassment, retaliation,
and hostile work environment, plus promulgation and posting of anti-
harassment and anti-retaliation policies. 3 24  In addition, the EEOC
announced a $1.525 million settlement.325
Decoster Farms led to one of the earliest successful petitions for a U-
visa nonimmigrant classification under the VAWA's Battered Immigrant
Women Protection.326  A parallel investigation by the Iowa Attorney
General and the DOJ accompanied the EEOC civil lawsuit and
demonstrated that the workers had suffered workplace abuses that qualified
for temporary protected status.3 27  On the advice of community advocates,
the EEOC relied on these tandem criminal investigations to satisfy
requirements for a U-visa, which offered not only temporary protected
status but also work authorization and a path toward legalization.328 The
EEOC filed U-visa applications on behalf of the immigrant workers with
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) using an extremely
320. William R. Tamayo, The EEOC and Immigrant Workers, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 253, 263 (2009).
More history of the U-visa and the EEOC is contained in Orloff et al., infra note 58; see also Amanda
Clark, A Hometown Dilemma: Addressing the Sexual Harassment of Undocumented Women in
Meatpacking Plants in Iowa and Nebraska, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 139 (2004).
321. Tamayo, supra note 320, at 263..
322. Complaint, supra note 322, at 4.
323. Press Release, EEOC Newsroom, EEOC and Decoster Farms Settle Complaint for $1,525,000
(Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-30-02-b.cfn (last visited
Nov. 21, 2012).
324. Consent Decree for EEOC v. Decoster Farms, Civil Action No. C02-3077MWB (N.D. Iowa
Oct. 3, 2002). Notice that the settlement came in 2002, the same year as Hoffman and during the Bush
Administration's EEOC.
325. Id.
326. Press Release, supra note 323; Phone Interview with EEOC Office of General Counsel
(4/6/2011).
327. Dennis McBride, EEOC Lead attorney (Milwaukee) met with the Assistant United States
Attorney and State Attorney General for the parallel litigation in DeCoster Farms. Telephone interview
with Regional Attorney (in San Francisco field office), EEOC (June I1, 2012).
328. Telephone Interview with EEOC attorneys in San Francisco and Chicago field offices (May
29, 2012).
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informal, ad hoc procedure.3 29 The attorneys involved recall "making it up
as we went along" when confronted with the forms to accompany the U-
visa petition.3 30 Nevertheless, the government cooperated and granted the
U-visa.33'
Subsequently, the EEOC developed procedures for the certification of
U-visas for eligible employees and proved willing to seek them for a wider
array of workplace abuses.33 2 Defying agency boundaries, they also worked
extensively with the other workplace agencies to develop similar
procedures." The DHS released U-visa guidelines in September 2007 that
enumerated certifying agencies.334 Each agency would develop its own
protocol for certifying petitions to the USCIS.3 Within the EEOC, the
protocol specified more stringent requirements for future U-visa
certifications-for example, EEOC regional attorneys retained authority to
certify applications, but only upon the recommendation of the EEOC
Chair.336 Although some claim that these changes have somewhat blunted
the availability of U-visas, others remark that the centralized process and
uniform standards help in regions less familiar with farmworker claims and




332. Memorandum from EEOC Chair Naomi Earp to District Directors on EEOC Procedures for U
Nonimmigrant Classification Certification (July 3, 2008), available at
http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additional-materials/immigration/u-visa/govemment-
memoranda-and-factsheets/U%20VISAEEOC%20Certification%20Memo_7.3.0
8 .pdf (last visited
Nov. 21, 2012).
333. Id.
334. On September 27, 2007, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services published an interim
rule, "Alien Victims of Certain Qualifying Criminal Activity," implementing the U nonimmigrant status
created by VAWA 2000. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2009). Subsection (g), "Duration of U nonimmigrant
status," provides that U nonimmigrant status may be approved for a period not to exceed four years in
the aggregate. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(g) (2009). USCIS will grant the derivative the extra time needed to
make his or her period in the United States equal four full years. On December 12, 2008, USCIS
published an interim rule, "Adjustment of Status to Lawful Permanent Resident for Aliens in T or U
Nonimmigrant Status," implementing the adjustment of status provisions for U nonimmigrants. This
rule became effective on January 12, 2009. 8 C.F.R. § 245.24 (2009) ("Adjustment of aliens in U
nonimmigrant status").
335. Id.
336. The EEOC certification protocol enacted July 3, 2008 was the first among the federal
workplace agencies. Memorandum from EEOC Chair Naomi Earp, supra note 332; EEOC certification
protocol on file with author.
337. Critics have long noted that the U-visa is only available when there is an ongoing worksite
investigation. Specifically, the critique is that the certification requirement has grown burdensome since
the DHS' 2007 U-Visa regulations. See Orloffet al. supra note 58, at 640 ("This complex, multilayered,
daunting process is having the effect of reducing EEOC's issuance of U-visa certifications."). Others
claim that the U-visa has become a wedge issue in the immigrant advocacy community because,
especially in the context of family violence (from which the U-visa emanates), many of the accused
abusers are themselves immigrants.
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After years in the making, the prominence of the U-visas continues to
rise. In January 2011, Commissioner Stuart Ishimaru organized a
Commission meeting on human trafficking to bring greater awareness to the
connection between trafficking, harassment, and other forms of workplace
abuse within the EEOC's jurisdiction."' Advocates have convened similar
meetings to publicize and encourage implementation of the EEOC U-visa
certification protocols and to combat Congress' attempts to limit U-visa
availability during VAWA reauthorization.3 39 The visas have become the
"remedy of choice for immigrant survivors of domestic and other forms of
violence, and the lawyers who represent them."340 It is an immigration
remedy that carries a much broader waiver than under VAWA, since it can
lead to a self-petition for adjustment of status that can be used to bring over
immediate relatives. "[M]any advocates consider the U to be the visa that
keeps on giving."34' Although it is not without problems or controversy, the
U-visa enables agencies to provide a valuable remedy to immigrants after
Hoffman limited available workplace remedies.
Summary. The EEOC case study confirms the bureaucratic politics
thesis developed in the DOL and NLRB case studies and also emphasizes
two distinctive features of the EEOC's policies toward undocumented
workers: its engagement with immigrant communities and its creative use
of guidance to promote policy positions not obviously required by Title VII.
The EEOC deploys its statutory mandate on behalf of immigrant workers
aggressively, by invoking the ethos of nondiscrimination that governs its
enforcement activities as justification for protecting workers without regard
to status. This approach is grounded in Title VII and the EEOC's close
engagement with farmworker communities experiencing novel forms of
discrimination (e.g. sexual harassment) and seeking nontraditional remedies
such as the U-visa. The agency's long-standing commitment to immigrant
workers-pre- and post-Hoffman-paved the way for the EEOC's
ingenious strategies of joining citizenship-based claims with sex-based
claims to petition successfully for U-visas that provide meaningful
assistance to immigrant workers.
338. See Written Testimony of Daniel Werner, Deputy Director, Immigrant Justice Project,
Southern Poverty Law Center (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.ecoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/1-19-
I l/werner.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2012); Written Testimony of Ana Isabel Vallejo, Supervising
Attorney, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/1-19-11/vallejo.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
339. The National Employment Law Project, for example, hosted a conference call on the subject
of retaliation that included discussion of U-visas and has printed materials describing the U-visa in
simple terms and collecting agency protocols. See, e.g., Nat'l Emp. Law Project, The U-Visa, supra
note 58.
340. Telephone Interview with staff attorney, NELP (June 12, 2012).
341. Id.
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IV.
VARIETIES OF REGULATORY RESPONSE
A. Theme and Variations
These case studies illustrate the regulatory responses of agencies
within the interstices of law and politics using a theme and variations
approach. Although they vary in their particulars, each case study
illustrates as its theme the core dynamics of bureaucratic politics that
improve the lives of immigrant workers through policy guidance, despite
challenging legal precedent. The common explanation emerging from the
case studies comports with Miles' Law: the career attorneys within the
workplace agencies set out to do their job-a job made more difficult by the
Hoffman decision-by prioritizing their professional commitments over
their personal convictions or political preferences. The disaggregated
components of Miles' Law,342 when posed as a policy-making process,
include: (1) a complex regulatory arena, with sufficient legal ambiguity to
invite (or at least permit) multiple interpretations and potentially conflicting
agency goals for implementation; (2) an individual commitment to
professional ethos that includes organizational mandates, a fidelity to legal
norms, and role identification; and (3) a sufficient openness in the political
environment to permit professionalism to penetrate partisan politics.
As for variations, more study is required to transform these
components of Miles' Law into variables that measurably sway
bureaucratic discretion toward or away from protecting immigrant workers.
The varying regulatory responses developed in these case studies suggest as
salient factors:
The relationship between the legal constraints on an agency and
the agency's development of an immigrant-friendly response. The
tighter the legal constraint on an agency, the narrower the opening
for policy innovation; the looser the constraint, the greater
possibility for such innovation. The NLRB continues to seek
remedies for immigrant workers in the narrow openings available
after Hoffman, but it is significantly constrained by recognition of
its duty to obey a law that directly contravened an earlier Board
ruling. Consequently, the Mezonos decision flows from Hoffman's
narrow reading of workers' rights. 343  In contrast, the EEOC
offensively deploys Title VII's mandate to eradicate employment
discrimination for protected classes of workers, to forestall
workplace abuse on the grounds of sexual assault-a legal ground
342. See Miles, supra note 65.
343. The Flaum memo's assertion that baseless status inquiries can be considered ULPs could
undo the grip of Hoffman, but it is raised in dicta and its effect on worker remedies is only speculative.
See Flaum, supra note 187.
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not contemplated by Hoffman that leaves a wide field for
interpretation and innovation.
* The complexity of the regulatory arena. The complexity of the
shared regulatory space between workplace agencies and
immigration enforcement agencies and, specifically, how taut the
tension is between their organizational goals of enforcing labor
laws and immigration laws influences the latitude for policy
innovation by the agencies. For example, given its long history of
clashing with immigration enforcement, the DOL pursued policies
of "deconfliction" with DHS to buffer potential conflicts between
immigration enforcement and labor enforcement priorities, such as
addressing retaliation and intimidation through DHS calls. The
space created by this buffer facilitates the DOL's ability to adopt
practices and policies helpful to immigrant workers.
* The extent of the politics shield to professional norms. This
dynamic is more subtle in the case studies provided, given that
both the Republican and Democratic administrations in place since
Hoffman in 2002 were relatively receptive to immigrant workers.
However, the DOL's greater vulnerability to changing political
leadership as a result of institutional design-the DOL is headed
by a single, cabinet-level secretary appointed by the President-
unsurprisingly demonstrates larger policy swings on U-visa
implementation. The DOL was the last to exercise its authority to
certify, and yet the most wide-reaching apparatus for doing so. It
also offered more cautious justifications than the independent
agencies led by bipartisan commissions, suggesting deference of
civil servants to political appointees in headquarters.
Miles' Law is not a surefire formula for success, however. This
Article argues that federal workplace agencies can sometimes help
immigrants. It does not argue that workplace agencies always, or even
usually, will engage in regulatory resistance. Because the research design is
not well-suited to explain how commonly bureaucratic efforts will benefit
immigrant workers, or to what extent, readers may reasonably inquire
whether the findings extend to agencies regulating immigrants in other
policy arenas. Unfortunately, the small sample of federal workplace
agencies responding to immigrants makes answering this question difficult.
Moreover, while variation exists across agencies, no discernible negative
case illustrates an agency that has declined to take such action.344 Thus,
while further research is needed to define the scope and persistence of the
bureaucratic incorporation theory, viable case studies are hard to come by.
344. In the course of presenting this article to fellow immigration scholars, some have
recommended including a case study of DHS and especially ICE. I have declined to do so because the
law enforcement mission of the DHS differs so radically from the workplace agencies that I am
comparing with one another, even if it also experiences mission conflict in some instances.
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B. Future Research
The seeds of further study are planted in these preliminary case studies.
Three studies are proposed: (1) U-visa implementation in federal workplace
agencies; (2) state-level regulatory responses to Hoffman; and (3) exercises
of discretion in the presence of executive orders.
First, the existing case studies indicate helpful variation in the extent of
U-visa implementation across workplace agencies.345 Further attention is
needed to the development of protocols and training that implement
regulatory policies within each agency. In the field offices of the three
federal agencies under study, interviews could be conducted with civil
servants and line attorneys more directly involved in enforcement, in
particular the five newly-selected U-visa Regional Coordinators in the
Department of Labor who work in conjunction with a national-level
specialist in the DOL headquarters. By moving closer to the ground to
inquire about the implementation of policies from above, the study would
move more directly into conversation with the literature being undertaken
by social scientists on street-level bureaucrats. Methodological benefits of
this expansion are that a broader, more representative sample of interviews
could be drawn and that siate and local variations could be taken into
account. A related expansion might include interviews with prosecutors
and other U-visa certifying officials. These officials have longstanding
authority in this area and, presumably, a wider variety of practices given
their number and geographical spread.
Second, study of state-level workplace policies would yield a greater
variety of responses to Hoffman, including positive responses that reinforce
constraints on remedies for undocumented workers, constituting negative
cases in the parlance of social science research design.3 46  Preliminary
research into state policies suggests that state-level responses to Hoffman
have been mixed in approach and result. The greatest amount of activity
has taken place in the courts, as employers seek to take advantage of
Hoffman to shield themselves from the penalties associated with violating
state employment laws.347 Only two states, California3 48 and Washington,3 49
345. For a general explanation of case study methodology and the need for variation in case
selection, see John Gerring, Case-Selection for Case Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative
Techniques, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL METHODOLOGY (Henry E. Brady, David Collier &
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier eds., 2008).
346. Id.
347. Corollary state litigation arose on wage loss (another form of monetary compensation) in
California.
348. CA LAB. COMMISSIONER BULL., Volume 2, Issue 1 (2002), available at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/SG-1abor- Spring02 comp8.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
349. Letter from Susan Jordan, Executive Director, Washington State Human Rights Commission,
to Antonio Ginatta, Director, Washington State Commission on Hispanic Affairs (Oct. 7, 2002) (on file
with NELP).
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have undertaken regulatory guidance to codify or amend Hoffman as it
pertains to backpay remedies under state employment and labor law. In
California, these regulatory guidances subsequently gave rise to state
legislative reform.310  State-level regulatory actions directly parallel to the
federal workplace agencies remain scarce, even if the dynamics identified at
the federal level exist in those instances."' Additionally, the long-standing,
pro-immigrant political climate in the states that have enacted these
regulation and legislation3 52 limits the possibility of generalizing about
insulation from politics in a useful way."'
Other than monetary remedies, two state agencies have adopted
equitable remedies along the lines of the U-visa: California's Department of
Fair Employment and Housing and New York's Department of Labor.3 54
The California policy enumerates the qualifying criminal activities, a subset
of the more severe federal grounds. California also specifies that the state's
Department of Fair Employment and Housing must conduct an ongoing
investigation into a Fair Employment and Housing Act or Ralph Act claim,
meaning that California's law contains a more stringent standard than the
comparable federal regulations on U-visas, which do not require ongoing
investigation of qualifying criminal activities."' The New York
Department of Labor is comparatively more generous: it covers all of the
qualifying criminal activities in the federal statute and requires only that the
investigating agency have jurisdiction over the claim. For the DOL, this
means that the petitioner must allege a New York State labor law violation
as well as the qualifying activity.35 6 Other state legislatures are considering
more U-visa policies, but none have enacted any at the time of
publication.5
In sum, these snapshots of regulatory action taken to strengthen the
rights of immigrant workers in several states suggests similar bureaucratic
behaviors as found in federal workplace agencies: pro-immigrant regulatory
350. See Undocumented Worker Rights, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(May 31, 2001), available at www.dir.ca.gov/qaundoc.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2012); Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3339 (2002); Cal. Gov't Code § 7285 (2002); Cal. Health & Safety Codes §§ 24000-26204 (2002);
Cal. Lab. Code § 1171.5 (2002).
351. Rebecca Smith, Amy Sugimori, Ana Avedailo & Marielena Hincapie, Undocumented
Workers: Preserving Rights and Remedies after Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/f4626d080903865d3e-q7m6bn3qp.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2012); Rebecca Smith, Amy Sugimori & Luna Yasui, Low Pay, High Risk: State
Models for Advancing Immigrant Workers' Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 597, 610 (2004).
352. It is worth noting, however, that California led the way on several anti-immigrant initiatives
such as Proposition 187, which limited eligibility of undocumented immigrants for public benefits.
353. See GLEESON, supra, note 119.
354. See Nat'l Emp. Law Project, The U- Visa, supra note 58.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Telephone Interview with staff attorney, NELP (June 12, 2012).
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interpretations in wage and hour law and remedies, some policy innovation
to develop alternatives to monetary remedies (including the U-visa taking
hold of federal workplace agencies), and strengthening protections against
national origin discrimination on the basis of citizenship and language.
Third, more attention needs to be paid to the role of the executive in
shaping the complex regulatory terrain within which agencies exercise
discretion. The Obama administration's replacement of an enforcement
strategy targeting worksites for immigration enforcement with, instead,
prosecutorial discretion that de-prioritizes non-criminal immigrants and
permits the possibility of administrative closure and removal of a low
priority cases from an immigration court's docket, could be a fruitful
subject for further study of agency-level discretion.359 Preliminary results of
the prosecutorial discretion program for immigrant workers in detention and
not otherwise charged with crimes or security violations are promising.3"o
However, the prosecutorial discretion program began as a pilot in only two
moderately-sized cities, and systematic studies of the case closure rates as it
has spread to larger cities have only recently begun to trickle out.3 6'
358. The availability of worker's compensation to immigrant workers provides fertile ground for
studying variation in state responses to Hoffman given that all fifty states have some type of worker's
compensation policy. Because there is no direct federal analogue to worker's compensation (for which
workers become eligible following injury), and because the state-level responses have mostly been
legislative, it is not included in this article. However, a growing literature documents the trends in
worker's compensation laws. See Rebecca Smith, Immigrant Workers and Workers' Compensation, 55
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 537 (2012); NAT'L EMP. LAW PROJECT, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: LIMITING
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS EXPOSES WORKERS TO
GREATER RISKS OF INJURY, BUSINESS TO GREATER COSTS (Jan. 2011), available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/f4626d080903865d3e-q7m6bn3qp.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2012); Jason
Schumann, Working in the Shadows: Illegal Aliens' Entitlement to State Workers' Compensation, 89
IOWA L. REV. 709 (2004); Anne Marie O'Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers' Compensation
After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299 (2006);
Katrina C. Gonzales, Undocumented Immigrants and Workers' Compensation: Rejecting Federal
Preemption of the California Workers' Compensation Act, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2001 (2008). Thanks
also to Shannon Gleeson for sharing a compilation of state workers' compensation laws (on file with
author).
359. Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/us/deportation-cases-of-illegal-immigrants-to-be-reviewed.html.
360. A 2011 DHS review of virtually all deportation cases before the immigration courts in
Baltimore and Denver to identify appropriate cases for prosecutorial discretion led to relief for I in 6 or
16% of cases. Julia Preston, In Deportation Policy Test, I in 6 Offered Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/us/in-test-of-deportation-policy-I -in-6-offered-
reprieve.html. Reports from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) show that new
filings seeking deportation orders for non-criminal aliens are also down. Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, Report: New Data Tracking ICE Prosecutorial Discretion, Feb. 13, 2012), available at
http://trac.syr.edu. The review of pending immigration removal cases is being extended to seven more
cities in 2012: Detroit, New Orleans, Orlando, Seattle, New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.
EOIR Statement Regarding Second Stage of Case-by-Case Review Pursuant to DHS' Prosecutorial
Discretion Initiative, DEP'T OF JUST., available at:
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2012/EOIRProsecutorialDiscretionO4O32012.htm.
36' According to figures obtained from the Los Angeles Times on July 30, 2012, DHS attorneys had
reviewed the files of nearly 360,000 cases and identified 23,000, or 6.4%, as provisionally eligible for
administrative closure. These numbers suggest that as the case review has progressed, the share of cases
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Workers are explicitly contemplated in the DHS' Morton memos providing
for prosecutorial discretion. 362 Ostensibly, clarifying that undocumented
workers who are otherwise not charged with serious crimes deserve
prosecutorial discretion indicates the Obama administration's vital
recognition of worker rights, whatever the motivation. However,
immigrant advocates note that the fast-paced review of the immigrants' files
(called A-files) does not contemplate the worker criteria laid out in the ICE
memo calling for discretion. An immigration attorney explained: "If I'm an
ICE attorney, the file will not include evidence of workplace abuse or
improper motives for reporting (such as retaliation), so these vulnerabilities
cannot be considered."36 3 Advocates also worry that without a "full-
throated media campaign" clarifying that prosecutorial discretion is "not a
call [for immigrants] to turn yourself over," misunderstandings about
prosecutorial discretion could lead to immigrants endangering themselves,
as opposed to recognizing that relief is available once they are already in
the process. 64 Even more attention will be given to the phenomenon of
prosecutorial discretion as it pertains to the White House's executive order
providing deferred action for childhood arrivals (mainly, undocumented
youth who became eligible for administrative relief from deportation orders
in lieu of a federal DREAM Act in August 2012)365 and to White House
reconsideration of 57 or so 287(g) federal-local law enforcement
partnerships that deputize trained local police officers to exercise federal
immigration authority and under review by the administration. 6 6
found eligible for administrative closure has grown smaller, but the reasons for this trend are unclear.
Ben Winograd, ICE Numbers on Prosecutorial Discretion Keep Sliding Downward (July 30, 2012),
available at http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/07/30/ice-numbers-on-prosecutorial-discretion-sliding-
downward/.
362. Memorandum of John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pd
363. Telephone Interview with immigrants' rights advocate (Jan. 23, 2012).
364. Id.; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Morton Memo and Prosecutorial Discretion,
IMMIGRATION PoLIcY CTR. (2011), available at http://immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/morton-
memo-and-prosecutorial-discretion-overview; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 243 (2010).
365. President Obama's executive order is implemented through procedures set forth by U.S.
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano in a memo to DHS branches, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012). The
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the responsible agency, began accepting applications on
August 15, 2012 and reports that from August 15, 2012 to December 13, 2012 a total of 355,889
requests had been accepted for processing. Of those cases, 102,965 requests had been approved, and no
requests had been denied. Updated statistics are kept by the USCIS and are available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/A
ll%20Form%20Types/DACA/DACA%2OMonthlyDEC%20Report%20PDF.pdf.pdf.
366. The 287(g) program, which was written into immigration law in 1996, allows police to do the
work that formerly only ICE agents could do; police become deputized immigration enforcement
officers with the authority to enforce immigration laws in their towns or localities or jails. However, the
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CONCLUSION: WHERE YOU STAND DEPENDS ON WHERE YOU SIT
This Article argues that regulatory agencies resist restrictive legal and
political environments hostile to immigrants' rights when doing so fulfills
their organizational goals and satisfies their professional ethos. Although
bureaucratic motivations are not entirely devoid of politics, the influence of
political leadership, partisan politics, and even personal policy preferences
are significantly constrained. Interviews with high-level officials and
agency staff in three federal workplace agencies revealed that bureaucrats
emphasize the organizational mission of workplace enforcement agencies to
protect all workers as a means to the end of protecting immigrant workers.
The apparent tension posed by the strategy of immigration enforcement
through worksite enforcement was seen to facilitate labor enforcement,
rather than to conflict with it, insofar as worksite enforcement eliminates
competitive advantages to employers hiring undocumented workers.
Politics certainly played a role in agency actions, but the way it influenced
agency actions was mostly indirect - it was filtered by the professional
ethos of the civil servants and career attorneys implementing regulatory
policy and organizational objectives such as resource allocation, efficiency,
and effectiveness. These findings held across all three federal workplace
agencies.
The implications for legal scholars, especially immigration law and
administrative law scholars, are important. For administrative law scholars,
this Article advances classic debates about bureaucratic discretion by
applying bureaucratic incorporation theory to original empirical research
demonstrating how and why workplace agencies use policy guidance to
resist contractions in immigrant workers' rights. The findings largely
comport with bureaucratic theory and administrative law scholarship. As
others have noted, for better or worse, agencies do not engage in a
terrain is changing after Arizona v. United States (2012) and a coalition of more than one hundred
advocacy groups and the Congressional Hispanic, Black, Asian American, and Progressive
Caucuses petitioning the White House for follow-through in December 2012. See e.g. Letter to DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano and ICE Director John Morton titled End the 287(g) Immigration
Enforcement Program (December 11, 2012), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/dec_2012_terminate-287g-sign-on-final-sent.pdf; Letter from
Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano (December 13, 2012),
available at http://roybal-allard.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=315283. On
December 21, 2012, the Obama administration announced that it would not renew 287(g) agreements
with local law enforcement and would instead rely on Secure Communities to focus on enforcement
priorities. News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE announces year-
end removal numbers, highlights focus on key priorities and issues new national detainer guidance to
further focus resources (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm. For scholarly treatments,
groundbreaking research into the effects of these federal-local enforcement programs is being conducted
by Monica Varsanyi, Marie Provine, Scott Decker, and Paul Lewis is being conducted under the NSF
project title "The Police and Immigration: Understanding Local Law Enforcement Policies And
Practices Across The United States."
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straightforward execution of statutory duties; they exercise discretion in
issuing guidance by reconciling their professional ethos with fidelity to
overlapping, and sometimes competing, laws." While politics is inevitably
involved, positive outcomes for immigrant workers are largely incidental to
politics-the product of independent forces such as organizational
imperatives and professional ethics. In unsettled and rapidly-changing legal
terrain-which characterizes immigration law generally and the
immigration law post-Hoffman specifically-these advisory opinions
impact the construction of undocumented workers' rights.
Administrative law scholars can and do debate whether guidance
appropriately drives agency discretion. Some scholars call for
administrative oversight to promote transparency and to constrain undue
agency autonomy:368 an example of this form of oversight is the Office of
Management Budget's "Good Guidance Practices,"' which urges agencies
to hold comment periods on proposed guidance for significant documents
and to post guidance on their websites. Other scholars call for judicial
review as a formal check on a highly informal area of governance.
Administrative law scholar Cynthia Farina, for example, notes that is tricky
to obtain judicial review and laments an "unfortunate" opinion by Judge
Harry Edwards on the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
taking the position that guidance is per se unreviewable.370 In contrast,
immigration law professor David Martin37' opines that getting sub-
regulatory guidance judicially reviewed will "inevitably reduce
transparency by discouraging the promulgation and publication of such
guidance-a net loss to good governance." 372  This Article does not
definitively settle the wisdom of proliferating agency guidance. It merely
367. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & and Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-
Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L. J. 2623 (2006).
368. See e.g. Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing
the Impact, 25 IND. L. REv. 299, 301 (1991); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency
Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State (2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/jessica-mantel/2/.
369. Memorandum from Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Issuance
of OMB's "Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices" (Jan. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2012).
370. E-mail from Cynthia Farina, Professor, Cornell Law School (Feb. 16, 2012).
371. David Martin is a professor of immigration law at the University of Virginia Law School and
former General Counsel for the INS.
372. E-mail from David Martin, Professor, University of Virginia Law School (Feb. 16, 2012).
Martin continues: "From my perspective as a former government lawyer, [guidance] is helpful to front-
line officers in their decision-making and it assists middle and upper level managers who are working to
assure both consistency in outcomes and the exercise of discretion in ways that follow the guidance of
politically responsible top executives, rather than the random conceptions of good policy held by
particular adjudicators . . . or outlier or rogue officers who stay within the hard legal limits set by statute
and regulation but regularly push the boundaries."
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hypothesizes that law and professional ethos doubly constrain the exercise
of discretion. These institutional dynamics do not resemble the runaway
bureaucrat presupposed and feared in much scholarship on administrative
agencies.
With regard to the distinctive place of law in the bureaucratic
construction of undocumented workers' rights, this Article recognizes that
agencies negotiate competing, if not contradictory, impulses from
immigration law and employment law after Hoffman."' Within this fluid
conception of law as a multilayered construct, the Article claims that
regulatory responses-manifested in policy guidance - derive from an
agency culture marked by principled professional commitments, not solely
from uncontested, "prescriptive rules that courts and legislatures send
out."374 These agency interpretations may be subsequently ratified by courts
and crystallized by Congress, either formally under doctrines of deference,
or more informally by allowing agency preferences to set the substantive
tone for interpretation and implementation."' The contradictory realities of
workplace regulation give rise to an ambivalent bureaucratic culture that
expresses itself in the guidance effectuated to help agencies do their work
on the ground. This revelation demonstrates for legal scholars-
particularly immigration law scholars-that studying courts and formal law
as a way to understand the development of rights merely scratches the
surface. To fully understand the development of rights, it is important to
penetrate the institutions, broadly defined to include agencies, that produce
rights.
This Article models a new style of inquiry into immigrants' rights that
draws on the insights of bureaucracy scholars in both the social sciences
and legal academy, and it is informed by an appropriately nuanced
conception of immigration law that recognizes the central place of guidance
in negotiating a contested legal terrain. Guidance may only be only one
data point-or a few data points, if there are structured comparisons of
multiple case studies-but placed alongside interviews and other subjective
indicators guidance can still be usefully revealing.
373. See Part lB.
374. Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, Making Way: Legal Mobilization, Organizational Response,
and Wheelchair Access, 46 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 167, 168 (2012) (cataloguing different notions of law in
distinct literatures examining the common question of law and social change).
375. An alternative interpretation of these case studies is that the real action resides in what public
choice theorists and legal skeptics already know: agencies cannot protect workers without protecting all
workers, including the undocumented, in the presence of de facto policies of tolerating large numbers of
undocumented workers. It is in their self-interest to protect immigrant workers. For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit utilized this reasoning in Agri Processor v.
NLRB, a case reviewing an NLRB order to an employer to bargain collectively with employees' union
representatives after employees, including undocumented aliens, voted to unionize. Agri Processor Co.
v. NLRB, 514 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 594 (2008).
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This methodological improvement has a normative prescription for
immigration scholarship: immigration scholars should probe the complex
motivations of bureaucrats, elusive as they may seem, in fashioning their
policy prescriptions. By taking seriously Miles' Law,3 76 immigration
scholars can turn their attention toward the factors-variables, loosely-
put-that elicit regulatory responsiveness toward their desired objectives.
The self-perceptions of lawyers and civil servants within workplace
agencies shape their ultimate actions. Scholars should speak to the
administrators of immigration law, in addition to courts and Congress. This
shift in emphasis may be more fruitful than making normative arguments
that protecting immigrants is a worthy end unto itself, especially in the
presence of ongoing ambivalence toward undocumented workers.
Finally, in the factual particulars, this Article suggests that clashes
between courts, Congress, and agencies about the meaning of Hoffman can
facilitate advancement of, or at least curtail the retreat of, immigrants'
rights when the law leaves space for agency discretion, thus allowing law
and politics to intertwine.3 These findings challenge the widely held
assumption that meaningful immigration reform can only happen when a
constellation of political stars align or when laws bar agency discretion to
depart from strongly pro-immigrant outcomes."' As political scientist
Robert Lieberman described in the context of expanding worker rights
under civil rights laws, when change occurs it "arises out of friction among
mismatched institutions and ideas."" There is the prospect of discretion
favorable to immigrant workers when dealing with law enforcement
agencies populated by civil servants anchored by a fidelity to the rule of law
and professionalism, even amidst a regulatory environment hostile to
immigrants' rights."
376. See text accompanying note 65.
377. Public choice theorists and interest group theorists contend that political incentives matter
most in the production of legal justifications for agency behavior, just as much as in the assertion of raw
political power. For example, interest group theory and public choice theory would predict pendulum
swings of political power or capture of regulatory agencies by entities such as employers. See supra text
accompanying note 89; see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2288 (2005) (discussing implications of lobbying by lateral agencies to ensure
agency accountability to secondary missions for models of agency behavior).
378. Lee, supra note 4, notes that paucity of empirical research to support normative arguments
about the effectiveness of immigration enforcement. He hesitates before drawing inferences from a fifty-
year old study by Kitty Calavita on the INS' implementation of the Bracero program to conclude that
DHS' culture is antagonistic to immigrants' rights and that the Department of Labor is unable to
overcome the anti-immigrant bias. Lee, supra note 4, at 1118 n.1 11; CALAVITA, supra note 139.
379. Robert C. Lieberman, Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,
96 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 697 (2002), available at joumals.cambridge.org/articleS0003055402000394
(last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
380. Others have pointed out that the converse is once again true: an agency with an anti-
immigrant or pro-immigration enforcement culture might undermine existing legal protections.
Examples might include the reports that some DHS officials have resisted presidential directives to
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engage in prosecutorial discretion rather than across-the-board removal of low priority immigrants in
detention. Julia Preston, Agents' Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012,
at Al5. My contention is that this counter-example actually furnishes support for my argument about
the relationship between law, politics, and bureaucracy. In the hypothetical case, the organizational
mission of law enforcement and legal compliance is focused on administration of IRCA and the civil
servants confronted with apparent conflicts between changed directives from their political leadership
prioritize their professional commitment-to the rule of law (in this case IRCA) -rather than the new
orders.
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